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In this age of ubiquitous communication in which we can stay constantly 
connected with the rest of the world, for most of the part, we have to be grateful 
for one particular invention - the Internet. But as the popularity of Internet 
connectivity grows, it has become a very dangerous place where objects of 
malicious content and intent can be hidden in plain sight. In this dissertation, we 
investigate different ways to detect and capture these malicious contents hidden 
in the Internet. First, we propose an automated system that mimics high-risk 
browsing activities such as clicking on suspicious online ads, and as a result 
collects malicious executable files for further analysis and diagnosis. Using our 
system we crawled over the Internet and collected a considerable amount of 
malicious executables with very limited resources. Malvertising has been one of 
the major recent threats against cyber security. Malvertisers apply a variety of 
evasion techniques to evade detection, whereas the ad networks apply inspection 
techniques to reveal the malicious ads. However, both the malvertiser and the ad 
network are under the constraints of resource and time. In the second part of this 
dissertation, we propose a game theoretic approach to formulate the problem of 
inspecting the malware inserted by the malvertisers into the Web-based
vi 
 advertising system. During malware collection, we used the online multi-AV 
scanning service VirusTotal to scan and analyze the samples, which can only 
generate an aggregation of antivirus scan reports. We need a multi-scanner 
solution that can accurately determine the maliciousness of a given sample. In 
the third part of this dissertation, we introduce three theoretical models, which 
enable us to predict the accuracy levels of different combination of scanners and 
determine the optimum configuration of a multi-scanner detection system to 
achieve maximum accuracy. Malicious communication generated by malware 
also can reveal the presence of it. In the case of botnets, their command and 
control (C&C) communication is good candidate for it. Among the widely used 
C&C protocols, HTTP is becoming the most preferred one. However, detecting 
HTTP-based C&C packets that constitute a minuscule portion of everyday HTTP 
traffic is a formidable task. In the final part of this dissertation, we present an 
anomaly detection based approach to detect HTTP-based C&C traffic using 
statistical features based on client generated HTTP request packets and DNS 
server generated response packets. 
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1.1 Motivation  
Most cyber crimes can be attributed to hacking or cracking, and computer virus 
or worm. Hacking or cracking falls into the category of malicious activity, in 
which the cyber criminal is online to perform malicious actions. On the other 
hand, computer virus or worm can be categorized as malicious content, in which 
the cyber criminal first injects the malicious contents into the victim system, and 
lets the malicious contents perform the malicious actions. In practice, there are 
many forms of malicious contents. A majority of them is classified as malicious 
software, or in short, malware. Malware is the primary and in many cases the 
only weapon of attack used by the cyber criminals. They usually use it in an 
intelligent way so that the victim remains unaware of the attack until very late. 
This is possible for the autonomous and active nature of software objects. Other 
forms of malicious contents involve some kind of malicious activity or 
communication and are passive on their own. Examples of such malicious 
content include botnet C&C communication, network intrusion packets, spam
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emails, etc. These passive malicious objects are created with stealthy 
characteristics as well. Therefore, detection of malicious contents is imperative 
for ensuring the security of most modern cyber systems.  
1.2 Problem Overview 
1.2.1 Collection and Inspection of Malware Hidden in Online Advertising 
To develop effective detection and mitigation techniques against malware, the 
first step is to develop a repository of existing malware samples for analysis and 
testing. For this purpose, we need an effecting malware collection system, which 
can provide us with the latest versions of active malware executable binary and 
other related files from various Internet sources. In the recent past, the online 
advertising system has become one of major sources of Internet malware. Over 
the years, this system has evolved to become very effective in reaching and 
delivering content to targeted audiences consisting of all kinds of Internet users. 
Recently, cyber-criminals have started exploiting this system as an effective and 
risk-free channel to disseminate malware. Many popular websites became 
victims to such exploitation and have had malicious advertisements placed on 
their webpages or widgets unknowingly, including Horoscope.com, The New 
York Times [1], the London Stock Exchange, Spotify [2], and The Onion. The 
most recent addition to this list was earlier in 2015 when HuffingtonPost website 
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served malicious ads via AOL ad-network [3]. Since the cyber criminal are 
already delivering their goods via malvertising, this should be a good source to 
find and capture active malware samples. But we have not seen any prior work 
where malvertising was considered a source of malware for collection. We want 
to address this issue in this dissertation.  
 Most malvertisements operate with the help of a tool called exploit kit [4], 
which can probe the vulnerabilities on the victim machine's web browser or 
plug-in in order to exploit and install the malware. There is an expensive price 
tag attached to the acquisition of these exploit kits. Moreover, in order to protect 
their "investments" on malicious ads and malware from detection by the ad 
network, malvertisers often apply to their campaigns a variety of evasion 
techniques such as fingerprinting the execution environment, redirecting to 
compromised IP addresses, and malware polymorphism (introduced in more 
detail in the next section). These evasion techniques also incur considerable 
overhead cost on the malvertiser. On the other hand, in order to control and limit 
the huge reputation damage and financial losses caused by malvertising 
campaigns [5], the ad network also spends a lot of money and efforts to apply 
inspection techniques on submitted ads, including live monitoring and code 
analysis. These inspection efforts also incur substantial overhead coming from 
labor, infrastructure, intellectual property fee for licensing diagnosis, time 
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needed to conduct analysis, and cost for establishing partnership with other 
companies for sharing of expertise and data [6]. However, we note that both the 
malvertiser and the ad network are under the constraints of resource and time, 
which makes it impossible and impractical for the malvertiser to always submit 
malicious ads and for the ad network to inspect every submitted ad. Therefore, 
the ad network needs proper guidelines to effectively manage its resources for 
inspection to maximize its chance to thwart possible malvertising campaigns. We 
intend to address this problem in this dissertation. 
1.2.2. Maximizing Accuracy in Multi-scanner Malware Detection System 
Malicious software or malware is one of the major tools of cyber attack. Every 
cyber attack involves some kind of malware. Therefore, detection of malware is 
one of the cornerstones of modern cyber security. For a long time, we have been 
relying on the anti-malware or anti-virus scanners to detect malware and to 
protect ourselves from it. Variety of anti-malware scanners have been developed 
over the years with different levels of performances. In the early days, a single 
scanner could detect most of the malware out there. But over time, the malware 
writers and their repository of malware has evolved and proliferated so much 
that no single anti-malware engine can protect us from all of them.  Moreover, 
researchers proved that combining the power of multiple anti-malware engines 
improve detection accuracy and performance significantly. This is why we now 
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have a lot of online multi-AV scanning services and tools (VirusTotal [8], Jotti, 
VirScan, etc.) at our disposal.  
Although we have many multi-AV scanning services and tools available, 
most of them are used only for informational purposes or as a source of second 
opinion. None of them directly provide an exact decision of whether a particular 
sample is malicious or benign. Instead, they work as an information aggregator 
and only list the individual results returned from each anti-virus scanning 
engine. The responsibility of making a decision based on these individual scan 
results is up to the human user. This may be convenient for personal use where 
an end-user is looking for a second opinion for an unknown sample downloaded 
from the Internet. But if we want to use these multi-scanner detection systems 
effectively for a large scale detection and collection operation, we need the 
system to automatically come up with the best decision. Now, the question 
remains - how the system can do that? Obviously, it has to use the available 
information at hand. Let's look at the available information we can have for the 
unknown sample set. Firstly, we have the individual scan results from various 
scanners, which can be considered merely as their opinions. We are labeling 
them as "opinions" since we don't know for sure whether they are right or 
wrong. Secondly, we have the   statistics for each scanner indicating their 
accuracy and performance. These statistics are accumulated from previous 
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scanning results which can be proven as right or wrong over the course of time. 
These statistical accuracy values can be used to measure how right or wrong 
these scanners can be. In other words, these are the ratings that indicate how 
good these scanners are. Now, the original problem becomes determining how to 
combine these detection accuracy ratings and the actual scan results for a given 
unknown sample to classify the sample as benign or malicious with the best 
possible accuracy. We further investigate this problem in this dissertation.  
1.2.3 Detection of HTTP Botnet Command and Control Traffic 
A botnet is a network of compromised computers, each of which harbors a piece 
of malicious software called bot. The bot software is remotely controlled by a 
botmaster, who exploits the botnet for malicious purposes like launching a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, spamming, performing click-fraud 
scams, stealing personal user information, etc. At the heart of any botnet is its 
communication architecture, i.e. how the botmaster communicates with 
hundreds and thousands of bot members. Since the size of a botnet is particularly 
crucial for its business, the botnet needs to be formed over common and popular 
network infrastructure, especially the Internet. Therefore, the botmaster chooses 
legitimate communication channels to interact with the bots. The server that the 
botmaster uses for its communication is called Command and Control (C&C) 
server. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) used to be the most prevalent communication 
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channel among the earliest botnets. Over time, it has been proved that the 
botnets formed over IRC network was not stealthy and the entire botnet could be 
shut down by simply taking down the IRC server. Moreover, network traffic 
monitoring on IRC based botnets was easier and effective in identifying C&C 
communication among botnet hosts. Consequently, botnets have evolved to 
adopt more common and generalized networking protocols and thus developed 
a stealth mechanism. Of the newer protocols used by botnets, peer-to-peer (P2P) 
protocols and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) are the most notable. The main 
advantage of using P2P networks is that it removes the centralized architecture 
from the botnet and makes it harder to shut down. However, P2P botnets suffer 
from higher latency in C&C communication and increased complexity in 
controlling the botnet as a whole. By contrast, HTTP, still being a centralized 
client-server protocol, provides the botmasters with desirable trade-off between 
stealth and performance. The protocol that runs the World Wide Web (WWW) is 
one of the most widely used network protocols, which helps the botmasters in 
bypassing most firewalls. In addition, HTTP allows using encryption to avoid 
detection based on deep packet inspection.  
Security researchers have been working for many years on botnet 
detection and mitigation. Over the recent years, we have seen a significant 
number of proposals on how to detect different types of botnets. A 
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straightforward approach is to apply C&C traffic signatures which can be very 
effective for a specific botnet. The problem with this approach is that new botnets 
emerge very fast with newer communication patterns, which require new 
signatures to detect.  To address this issue, most of the network traffic based 
methods apply some kind of machine learning algorithm to train and identify 
communication patterns and thus adapt to newer threats. However, these 
methods still focus on identifying botnet communication itself based on certain 
features, rather than isolating legitimate communication from the malicious ones. 
It is far easier for the botmasters to avoid certain patterns and come up with new 
techniques when they already know what patterns the defenders are looking for. 
Consequently, the detection methods begin to suffer from deteriorating 
performances against newer botnets. The detection of botnet C&C traffic 
becomes much more difficult when it comes to HTTP based C&C, since the 
percentage of C&C packets among the overall everyday Web traffic is in 
microscopic range. We investigate this problem further in this dissertation. 
1.3 Overview of Dissertation 
In this dissertation, we address four problems in the area of detection of 
malicious contents hidden in the internet. The organization of this dissertation is 
as follows.  
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 In Chapter 2, we provide a background on online advertising and 
malicious display ads and propose automated simulation of the user clicks and 
automatic downloads to collect and analyze malicious executable files generated 
in the process. We implemented an automated system to mimic harmful and 
risky browsing activities such as clicking on suspicious online ads, and thereby 
to collect malicious executable files for further analysis and diagnosis. Using our 
system we crawled over the Internet for a period of 3 months to collect a 
significant amount of ad frame or placeholder URLs, which has been monitored 
for another period of 3 months to collect more than 13 thousand malicious 
executables. The experimental results showed that our system is quite effective in 
collecting online malware samples within a short period of time using very 
limited resources compared to other honeypot systems. 
 In Chapter 3, we provide a brief background on game theory and model 
the malvertising inspection problem as a game between an attacker (the 
malvertiser) and a defender (the ad network). We define the strategies and 
payoff functions of each player. We assume both players are aware of each 
other's strategies, cost and payoff functions, and the rate of malvertising 
detection by the ad network. We then calculate pure strategy and mixed strategy 
Nash equilibria for the game. Through the game model, we intend to better 
understand the relationship between the malvertiser and the ad network and 
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extract insights that can guide the ad network in its choice of inspection 
strategies.  
In Chapter 4, we address the problem of finding an optimum 
configuration in multi-scanner malware detection systems by first deriving a 
mathematical model named Combined Probability Model (CPM) to capture the 
combined outcome of a specific combination of scanners, given their individual 
detection rates. The mathematical model consists of a set of formulas involving 
individual detection probabilities of the scanners. The model gives us a good 
approximation of the combined true and false detection probabilities of the 
combined system of scanners, which can be used to calculate the overall accuracy 
of the multi-scanner system for a specific configuration. Therefore, if we can 
calculate the accuracy of all configurations of the system, we can compare them 
to determine the optimum configuration that provides us with the maximum 
accuracy. We also present two other greedy heuristic based approximation 
models called Greedy Approximation Model (GAM) and Complementary 
Greedy Approximation Model (CGAM). These models apply greedy 
approximation over CPM formulas to improve runtime and at the same time try 
to maintain the accuracy as much as possible. In addition to the original problem, 
we also try to answer the following two questions - (1) Is it always beneficial to 
increase the number of scanners in a multi-scanner detection system? (2) How 
11 
can we select a subset from all available scanners, which will provide us with a 
maximum accuracy for a size of the given subset? To address the second 
question, we come up with a ranking system for the scanners which allows us 
select a best subset from the full set of scanners. To verify the accuracy of our 
models and to answer these additional questions, we first numerically simulate 
our models over randomly generated hypothetical datasets and test case 
scenarios. From the simulation results, we found that if the average false positive 
rate of the scanners is high enough, the accuracy value of multi-scanner system 
can decrease at some point with the increase in the number of scanners. At the 
end, we provide experimental evaluation based on real-world malware and 
goodware datasets and corresponding anti-virus scanning results using a 
popular online multi-AV scanning service, VirusTotal. From the evaluations, we 
can verify the accuracy of our simulation results and establish that our models 
along with the ranking system perform reasonably well in predicting the 
optimum configuration to achieve maximum accuracy based on available 
information. 
In Chapter 5, we introduce an anomaly detection based approach to detect 
HTTP-based botnet C&C communication which focuses on how to prevent the 
botnet from upgrading itself to avoid detection. That means, we want to make it 
very hard for the botmaster to mimic the legitimate HTTP communication and 
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hide C&C activities. Our approach is based on identifying anomaly in client 
generated HTTP request packets as well as DNS server generated response 
packets for the same HTTP communication. Based on some initial analysis of 
both legitimate and botnet C&C HTTP traffic, we have selected some statistical 
features that are suitable for detecting anomaly in a large set of captured HTTP 
traffic. These features are based on patterns emerging from HTTP request 
packets, more specifically, the URL string that is used to fetch data from an 
HTTP server. Using these features we primarily run an unsupervised anomaly 
detection algorithm to distinguish between HTTP request packets generated by 
human actions and HTTP request packets generated by a software bot, both 
legitimate and malicious. Then, to further narrow down the isolated packets, we 
extract the primary domain names involved in those packets and run a semi-
supervised anomaly detection algorithm using a selected set of features based on 
the DNS server response packets that particularly contain resolved IP address list 
(A or AAAA record). Eventually, we are left with a list of domain names that are 
highly probable to be involved in malicious C&C communication. Results 
indicate that our method can achieve more than 90% detection rate while 
maintaining a reasonably low false positive rate. 
 Finally, we conclude the dissertation with a brief summary of the research 




COLLECTION OF MALWARE DISSEMINATED VIA 
MALVERTISING 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Online Advertising 
Online advertising is a form of advertising that uses the Internet as the delivery 
channel for promotional marketing messages to consumers. It includes all sorts 
of online marketing such as email marketing, search engine marketing (SEM) [7], 
social media marketing, display advertising, mobile advertising, etc. In this 
chapter, our focus is only on display advertising, the type of advertising that is 
located on websites in a wide range of different formats and contains items such 
as texts, images, flash, video, and audio. Besides the consumer, there are three 
major participants in online advertising described as follows. The Ad Publishers 
are the owners of the websites or online contents, who integrate or place 
advertisements into their contents. The Ad Networks are the companies that 
work as the middlemen who connect the Advertisers to interested Ad Publishers 
that want to host advertisements. Online Ad Networks usually maintain a
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central ad server which delivers advertisements to consumers, and also facilitates 
ad related activities such as targeting, tracking, reporting and billing. Lastly, the 
Advertisers are the business entities or individuals who are interested in 
promoting their products through online advertising. Figure 2.1 illustrates a 
typical scenario of how the ad delivery system works. From Figure 2.1 we can 
see four request-response style communications. The first such interaction is 
when the user opens a webpage hosted by the ad publisher who displays the ad 
frame or placeholder (referred to as adbox in the figure). This action triggers a 
background interaction of the browser with the ad network to fetch the actual 




ads. This is shown as the second pair of request-response communication. The 
third interaction happens when the user actually clicks on the ad. The ad 
network sends the redirected URL as response which triggers the browser to 
request it to generate the final request-response communication. As a result, the 
browser gets the ad landing page.  
2.1.2 Infection Process of Malicious Ads 
The infection process of malicious ads can be largely divided into two categories: 
silent infection and user triggered infection. Silent infection can occur when an 
Internet user only visits a legitimate website that contains malicious ads. In this 
case, the malicious ad itself contains malicious code (written in JavaScript, Action 
Script, etc.) which can find Web browser vulnerabilities and exploit them to 
infect the user system. This is the most dangerous form of infection, since it does 
not require any interaction or trigger from the user. The mere action of visiting a 
legitimate and otherwise safe website triggers the infection. On the other hand, 
user triggered infections require some form of user interaction such as click or 
key press events. By refraining from risky interactions, the user can prevent 
infection in most cases. After the first interaction with the malicious ad, the user 
usually ends up visiting a malicious ad landing page hosted by the malicious 
advertiser. From this page, the user may also be infected in two ways: either 
automatically or based on further user interaction. The ultimate outcome can be 
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one the following three results: user system being infected, a malicious browser 
add-on being installed, or a malicious executable file being downloaded. Figure 
2.2 depicts various paths and outcomes generated when an ad publisher 
webpage is visited. The bold-faced sections of the figure highlight the path we 
focus on in this chapter. 
Figure 2.3(a) shows a sample malicious ad frame. This is a typical 
malicious ad falsely claiming that the user needs to update his or her media 
player. If the user clicks on anywhere inside the ad frame (not just the buttons), it 
will open a new page where the user will be prompted to download a malicious 
binary executable file with names like "mediaplayer.exe" or 
"mediaplayerupdate.exe". Figure 2.3(b) shows the underlying JavaScript code for 
the same ad frame. We can clearly see here that the target ad landing page URL 
Figure 2.2 Infection paths of malicious advertisements. 
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Figure 2.3 (a) Sample malicious ad frame, (b) JavaScript code for the same 
malicious ad frame. 
(a) (b) 
cannot be identified straightforwardly. Only after this JavaScript code is 
executed in the Web browser, we can see the target URL. This is the primary 
reason why we need to simulate user clicks on the ads to find the target URL. 
2.2 System Design 
Our system can be divided into four major components, including (i) Crawler, 
(ii) Detector, (iii) Extractor, and (iv) Verifier, as depicted in Figure 2.4. It also 
shows the input and output of each component. Each component implements a 
major stage in the overall process of collection and analysis of malicious 





The main task of this component is to crawl over the Internet and find ad frames 
or placeholders in various websites. To increase the effectiveness in finding 
websites with more ads and potential malicious ads, it makes use of the popular 
Internet search engines like Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc. A pre-defined list of search 
keywords is used to search websites via different search engines and extract a list 
of URLs. Then, the web pages of these URLs are fetched and parsed to detect ad 
frames or placeholders that display textual or graphical ads. If detected, the ad 
frame or placeholder URL is recorded into a list of ad frame URLs for further 
processing. Figure 2.5 shows a flowchart of the overall process of the Crawler. 





This component uses the list of ad frame URLs generated by the Crawler and 
detects whether the ad eventually results in a malicious download or not. To 
achieve this, we need to know what the target URLs are for the ads and test 
whether any one of them lead to an executable file download event. A simple 
HTML ad will contain the target URL as part of a plain HTML element. 
However, with the widespread use of Web 2.0 technologies, most of the ads now 
contain complex JavaScript or Action Script code (as shown in Figure 2.3), where 
it is very hard to find or generate the target URL. Therefore, we intend to 
Figure 2.5 Flowchart of Crawler. 
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simulate user interaction such as mouse click on the ad itself which will trigger 
the target ad landing page URL for us. Once we can fetch the ad landing page, 
we can further parse and inspect to determine whether it contains any download 
URL which lead to a download of an executable binary file. If the Detector 
detects at least one such download URL, it records the download URL along 








We make use of the ad frame URLs that is generated by the Detector to 
download more executable files. The design of the Extractor is similar to the 
Detector except that it is used to periodically monitor (and download from) only 
the already detected ad frame URLs. Using this approach we can maximize the 
number of downloaded files from a minimum number of ad frame URLs, since 
the contents of the ad placeholder changes dynamically over time with a 
probability of generating a new ad every time. Thus, by monitoring a single 
malicious ad placeholder we can extract many different malicious files. In 
addition, we can investigate the behavior of a single malicious ad frame URL and 
find out answers to questions like how frequently ads change, how many distinct 
download URLs are generated from the same ad frame, etc. Examples of such 
analysis results are further discussed in section 2.4. 
2.2.4 Verifier 
This is the part where we automatically submit the collected executable files to 
anti-malware scanning engines to verify the maliciousness of them. Instead of 
using a single scanner, we used the online service provided by VirusTotal [8] 




2.3 System Implementation 
We have implemented our system using Python 3.4. Details of the 
implementation for each component are given in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.1 Crawler 
We used a list of search keywords generated from Table 2.1. Each keyword is 
generated by combining one or more qualifier keywords and one content 
keyword. To create this list of potential keywords, we tried to answer the 
following question: what types of websites are most likely to host high number 
of advertisements? To find the answer, we manually analyzed 20 ad-filled 
websites collected from various Internet discussion forums. We found that most 
of the websites offer free services or contain free contents, for which they try to 
compensate by placing as many ads as possible.  
Table 2.1 Search Keywords 
 























 Therefore, a good qualifier keyword is "free". Similarly, we found that one 
of the most desired services is downloading some content or data from the 
Internet. Hence, "download" should be a good qualifier keyword.  
The fetching and parsing of websites has been done using Python libraries 
"Requests" [9] and "lxml" [10] respectively. The detection of ad frames or 
placeholders has been done using the Python library "adblockparser" [11] and a 
list of filters from EasyList [12], an ad filter provider service designed for the 
most popular ad blocking Web browser extension Adblock Plus [13].   
2.3.2 Detector 
To implement the Detector, we needed some way to simulate the user click 
events on the ads. Selenium WebDriver API [14] provided us with such features. 
This Python API can be easily used to simulate the behaviors exactly like what a 
normal human Web user will do, such as opening a URL in the browser, clicking 
on an ad, switching to new pages as a result of the clicking, responding to any 
JavaScript alert generated in the process, etc. A difficult task was to determine 
where to click, since ads are dynamically generated with varying sizes. 
Fortunately, Selenium provides a way to click on a specific HTML element. 
Therefore, we iterated over all the HTML elements of the ad and generated click 
event for them. The assumption we make is that at least one of the elements 
should be clickable and should produce our desired ad landing page as a result 
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of the click event. This is a valid assumption since usually the ads are generated 
such that the entire ad frame is clickable and the user can click anywhere inside 
the frame to produce the ad landing page. 
After the ad landing page is opened, we parse the HTML source and find 
all target URLs leading to external resources. Here, the Selenium WebDriver 
executes most of the internal JavaScript code and we can use the innerHTML 
property (the property that sets or returns the HTML content of an element) for 
each element to get the generated HTML code from JavaScript code. In this way, 
we can make sure that we don't miss any target URL generated by internal 
JavaScript codes. 
2.3.3 Extractor 
The implementation of the Extractor is similar to Detector. The only difference 
lies in the input and output. The input for the Extractor only contains those ad 
frame URLs that have been detected already, and the output contains 
downloaded executable files with corresponding download URLs for a specific 
ad frame URL. We map the downloaded files and URLs to a specific ad frame 






The VirusTotal API [15] provided by VirusTotal is used to implement the 
Verifier. For each of the downloaded files, we generated a scanning report from 
VirusTotal which contains how many anti-virus scanners have detected the file 
as malicious and what classes of malware the file belongs to. 
2.4 Results and Analysis 
We tested our system for a total period of 6 months and divided it into two 
stages of 3 months each. In the first stage, we deployed the Crawler and the 
Detector for 3 months. The Crawler used the search keywords generated from 
Table 2.1 and crawled 51,467 websites, where 10,950 of them contained at least 
one advertisement. The number of detected ad frame URLs were 73,240, which 
were passed to the Detector. We detected ad frames containing at least one target 
URL which lead to the download of executable binary files. In total, we found 
895 such ad frame URLs. This is our input to the second stage of experiment. 
In the second stage, we ran the Extractor for 3 months to monitor and 
extract downloads from 895 suspicious ad frame URLs. It ran a single iteration 
over all 895 of them 3 times a day. We recorded the download URLs along with 
the downloaded files for each individual ad frame URL. In total, we found 13,648 
distinct executable binary files downloaded in the process. These files were fed to 
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the Verifier to identify false positives checking against 56 anti-virus scanners 
provided by VirusTotal. Only 115 files out of 13,648 pass all the anti-virus 
scanners as benign and 13,353 files were identified by at least one scanner as 
malicious. This means that 99% of the files collected by our system were 
identified as malicious by VirusTotal. Table 2.2 lists the number of different types 
of malware detected. A single malware sample can belong to two or more 
different categories, since modern malware is packaged with multiple features 
and functionalities. Here, we have considered all the labels for a single sample 
labeled by different scanners. From the VirusTotal reports, we found that on an 
average each sample was detected as malicious by at least 9 out of 56 scanners. 
Table 2.2 Types of Malware Detected 
 
Malware Type Total Number Percentage 
Adware 12,952 97% 
Trojan 10,816 81% 
Virus 4,406 33% 
Backdoors 3,872 29% 
Potentially Unwanted Program 12,151 91% 
 
Some interesting results were observed when we grouped the malware 
samples and their download URLs by corresponding ad frame URL. We 
observed that every time we extracted the download target, a new distinct URL 
can be found. Even though the downloaded binary files looked exactly same 
with respect to name and size, the files were found to be different when MD5 
hash was calculated. We found that during the 3 month period, we could extract 
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approximately 49 malware samples on an average from a single ad frame URL, 
with a maximum of 255 samples. After the 3 month period ended, we replayed 
all download URLs to check their validity. 21% of them were still working while 
the rest of them were redirecting to a different webpage. In addition, malware 
samples collected from a single ad source usually fell into the same malware 
family or class. From these observations, we conclude that (1) a single malicious 
ad frame URL can be monitored for a long period of time to consistently collect 
malware samples, (2) URL that hosts the malware is changed frequently to 
provide a constant availability of malware as well as to thwart takedown efforts, 
(3) even though the malware samples disseminated by a single ad source belong 
to the same class or family, they could be distinct in binary content, which means 
every now and then a new malware payload is generated with a relatively short 
lifetime. 
Additionally, we tested the captured download URLs via VirusTotal URL 
scanner service. We found that only 34% of the URLs were flagged as malicious 
by at least one URL scanner. Therefore, the list of malicious download URLs 





2.5 Related Work 
In the scientific literature, malicious online advertising is better known as 
"malvertising" by taking the portmanteau of the words "malicious" and 
"advertising". Although numerous news articles have been published on 
malvertising, not many research articles can be found on this topic. 
Sood et al. [16] provided one of the earliest accounts of how malvertising 
works. They explained several malvertising modes and offered a few guidelines 
to prevent them. S. Manfield-Devine presented the recent state of malvertising in 
[17], describing the use of Flash and mobile websites. Zhang et al. [18] proposed 
a detection scheme to detect malvertising cases using depth of the URL 
strategies. In addition, Google has opened a website [19] dedicated to prevent 
malvertising compromises in all of Google's and partners' ad properties in an 
effort to build community awareness against it.  
There has been a considerable amount of research done regarding Web-
based malware collection. In the year 2006, researchers from Microsoft [20] came 
up with an automated Web patrolling system to automatically identify and 
monitor malicious websites that install malware programs by exploiting browser 
vulnerabilities. Since then, we have seen many other research efforts to automate 
malware collection from the Web. Worth mentioning among these are 
HoneyBow [21], PhoneyC [22], Rozzle [23], WebPatrol [24], HoneyInspector [25], 
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and PMCCS [26]. HoneyBow toolkit is an automated malware collection system 
based on high-interaction honeypots, which are able to collect autonomous 
spreading malware in an automated manner. PhoneyC is a virtual honeyclient 
that mimics the behavior of the user-driven network client applications such as 
Web browsers and is exploited by an attacker's content to reveal the attack in the 
process. Rozzle is a JavaScript multi-execution environment that can reveal 
environment specific Internet malware. WebPatrol automatically collects Web-
based malware scenarios including complete Web infection trails to enable 
further detailed analysis. HoneyInspector is another active honeypot system that 
collects malware from malicious websites as well as from shared P2P files.   
Proactive Malware Collection and Classification System (PMCCS) uses P2P 
software to actively search suspicious malware samples such as software crack 
tools. Although each of these research works presents a way to collect Web-based 
malware samples, none of these have explored malvertising and considered it as 
a source of malware collection and analysis. 
2.6 Summary 
Our main contribution in this work is, we have designed and implemented an 
automated system to collect malware samples from online advertising sources. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first efforts to automate 
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information collection for malvertising research, which can reveal many new 
paths of investigation and analysis in this area. Moreover, the collected samples 
are instances of live and active malware that are infecting Internet users at this 
very moment, which are extremely useful for research purposes. 
As of now our system can only collect information related to 
downloadable executable binary files via malvertising sources. If we refer back to 
Figure 2.2, we can see that we have only implemented one path in the malicious 
ad infection process. There are still two more paths yet to be explored. One is 
where the system is infected in the background, that is, a malicious code is 
executed in the browser through browser vulnerabilities and plug-in exploits. 
The other one is where a malicious add-on is installed into the browser. We can 
further extend our work to incorporate both of these infection paths. 
Along with the malicious executable files, we can collect the HTML, 
JavaScript and Action Script sources of the malicious ads and further investigate 
to find patterns so that they can be used in the future to detect malicious ads 
before they are executed. Moreover, the defenders can use the information about 
these patterns to develop mitigation strategies. This can be a very important 




CHAPTER  3 
A GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF MALVERTISING 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Overview of Game Theory 
Game theory identifies multi-person decision scenarios as games where each 
player selects actions which result in the best possible self rewards, while 
anticipating and considering the rational actions from other players. A player is 
the basic entity of a game who makes choices of what actions to perform. A game 
is a formal description of the strategic interaction that includes the constraints of, 
and payoffs for, a set of actions that the players can choose from, without 
specifying what actions they actually take. A solution concept is a formal 
description of how the game will be played by applying the best possible 
strategies and what the results might be. A strategy for a player is a complete set 
of actions in all possible scenarios throughout the game. If the strategy specifies 
to take a unique action in a scenario then it is called a pure strategy. If the 
strategy specifies a probability distribution for all possible actions in a scenario 
then the strategy is referred to as a mixed strategy. 
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 Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that describes an equilibrium state 
of the game where no player would prefer to change his strategy as that would 
lower his payoffs given that all the other players are adhering to their respective 
strategies. This solution concept only specifies the equilibrium state but does not 
specify how that state is reached in the game. The Nash equilibrium is the most 
famous equilibrium and one of the most used solution concepts in game theory.   
3.1.2 Game Theory Definitions 
Game 
A game is a formal description of the strategic interaction between opposing or 
co-operating entities where constraints and payoff for actions are taken into 
consideration. 
Player 
A player is a basic entity in a game that is required to make choices for actions.  
Action 
An action is a player's move in the given game. 
Payoff 





A strategy is a set of actions that a given player can choose during game play. 
3.1.3 The Malvertising Game 
The major motivation behind malvertising is the potential lucrative profit. Many 
malvertising campaigns install on vulnerable machines a variety of ransomware, 
which encrypts user data and files and forces users to pay a ransom of several 
hundred dollars to obtain the decryption key. According to the 2016 Annual 
Security Report published by Cisco [27], the estimated yearly income from 
ransomware per successful malvertising campaign could reach as high as $34M. 
However, this potentially huge profit does not come for free; there is a cost 
associated with launching a campaign. Most malvertisements operate with the 
help of a tool called exploit kit [4], which can probe the vulnerabilities on the 
victim machine's web browser or plug-in in order to exploit and install the 
malware. Malvertisers need to either develop the exploit kit from scratch (need a 
lot of investment), hire someone to do it (there is a list of task prices in the Deep 
Web black market [28]), purchase it (about $20-30K [28]), or rent it (about 
$500/month [28]). There is an expensive price tag attached to any option. 
Moreover, in order to protect their "investments" on malicious ads and malware 
from detection by the ad network, malvertisers often apply to their campaigns a 
variety of evasion techniques such as fingerprinting the execution environment, 
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redirecting to compromised IP addresses, and malware polymorphism 
(introduced in more detail in the next section). These evasion techniques also 
incur considerable overhead cost on the malvertiser. 
 On the other hand, in order to control and limit the huge reputation 
damage and financial losses caused by malvertising campaigns [5], the ad 
network also spends a lot of money and efforts to apply inspection techniques on 
submitted ads, including live monitoring and code analysis. Similar to the case of 
launching malvertising campaigns, these inspection efforts also incur substantial 
overhead coming from labor, infrastructure, intellectual property fee for 
licensing diagnosis tools (sometimes including purchasing exploit kits for 
analysis purpose), time needed to conduct analysis (ranging from a few minutes 
to tens of hours, on average around 10 hours per case), and cost for establishing 
partnership with other companies for sharing of expertise and data [6]. 
 However, we note that both the malvertiser and the ad network are under 
the constraints of resource and time, which makes it impossible and impractical 
for the malvertiser to always submit malicious ads and for the ad network to 
inspect every submitted ad. Therefore, the malvertising inspection problem can 




3.1.4 Attacker and Defender Strategies in Malvertising Game 
Malicious advertisers employ many strategies to evade detection including 
fingerprinting, redirection, just-in-time assembling and compilation, obfuscation, 
timing based evasion, etc. Researchers at Malwarebytes and GeoEdge [29] 
investigated malvertising campaigns for several months and found out about an 
effective evasion technique used by the threat actors called fingerprinting. This 
technique is actually not new, rather has been used by the exploit kits for some 
times now. Now it is being used earlier rather than late in the malvertising chain, 
helping the malicious advertisers to decide whether to display a malicious ad or 
a benign ad. Basically, the fingerprinting technique employs sophisticated 
obfuscated code inside the ad to detect indications that can identify a machine 
belonging to a security researcher or a honeypot. Researchers at Invincia [30] 
identified a new technique called "just-in-time" (JIT) or on-host assembly of 
malware. This novel approach can evade detection from network sandbox and 
traditional endpoint security solutions while compromising vulnerable systems. 
JIT malware uses late-binding techniques to assemble a malware executable on 
the target endpoint itself in order to evade network sandbox analysis. In 
addition, native Windows components from the target machine are used to 
assemble the payload. This helps in evading endpoint white-listing approaches 
that allow only approved programs to run. The most recently discovered 
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AdGholas [31] malvertising campaign have been found to have used 
steganography and file whitelisting approach to evade detection.  
 Most of the malvertising campaigns involve an exploit kit to carry out the 
infection or delivery of malicious payload. Prominent examples of exploit kits [4] 
include SweetOrange, Angler, Magnitude, Rig, Nuclear, etc. Exploit kits are also 
equipped with evasion techniques [4] such as fingerprinting, obfuscation, etc. 
Researchers have found that through a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, an 
attacker can check the presence of files or folders in an affected system, thereby 
detecting whether the system is a virtual machine or has an antivirus software 
installed. For obfuscation purposes, the use of Pack200 archive format has been 
seen in use by Angler exploit kit. Other evasion techniques include encrypted 
payload, IP and domain fluxing, domain shadowing, and file-less infections [32].   
 There has been some work done by both industry and academic 
researchers on the strategies that can be employed by the defender, i.e. the ad 
network or the ad publisher. GeoEdge [6] is a commercial provider for ad 
verification and protection services. Their services include automated ad 
verification solution that monitors live advertisements using a globally 
distributed network of monitors. Similar techniques involving crawling and 
monitoring have been found in some prior academic research works as well [33, 
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34, 35, 36]. Another focus of research was to detect malicious exploit kits. Taylor 
et al. [37] proposed a network-centric technique to detect malicious exploit kits 
by capturing tree-like web request structures and finding similarities among 
them. Their approach is based on the insight that to infect a client browser, a 
web-based exploit kit must guide the client browser to visit its landing page 
through multiple redirections generating a pattern of multiple web requests. This 
pattern can be identified as a tree-like structure and used for the purpose of 
detection of malicious exploit kits. Stock et al. [38] presented Kizzle, an antivirus 
signature generator for detecting exploit kits. Wang et al. [39] presented an 
approach for identifying new undetected landing pages that lead to drive-by 
downloads by using malicious content patterns identified in previously known 
collection of Malware Distribution Networks. Malicious obfuscated JavaScript 
code has been an integrated part of malvertising campaigns. Lu and Dubray [40] 
presented an approach for automatic de-obfuscation of JavaScript code using 
dynamic analysis and slicing that preserves code semantics. The resulting code 
becomes observationally equivalent to the original program with obfuscation 
removed which exposes the core logic of the computation it performs. Xu et al. 
[41] presented JStill, a mostly static approach to malicious obfuscated JavaScript 
detection that uses static analysis of function invocation and lightweight runtime 
inspections. Dong et al. [42] proposed AdSentry, a sandbox for JavaScript-based 
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advertisements that enables flexible controlling on ad script behaviors by 
completely mediating its access to the web page (including its DOM) without 
restricting the JavaScript functionality exposed to the ads. Dewald et al. [43] 
presented ADSandbox, an analytical sandbox system for malicious websites that 
executes any embedded JavaScript within an isolated environment and log every 
critical action. Analyzing these logs using heuristic rules, ADSandbox can decide 
whether the site is malicious or not. Another useful evasion technique employed 
by the attackers is URL redirection. Mekky et al. [44] presented a method to 
identify malicious chains of HTTP redirections using supervised decision tree 
classifiers. 
3.2 The Malvertising Game Model 
Our solution aims to apply game theory to formulate the problem of inspecting 
the malware inserted by the malvertisers into the Web-based advertising system. 
We define a normal form game of two players, the Attacker and the Defender. 
The Attacker represents the malvertiser, whose goal is to distribute as many 
copies of its malware to vulnerable machines as possible when unwitting users 
visit legitimate websites (i.e. ad publishers). The Defender represents the ad 
network, whose goal is to detect and remove malicious online ads before they are 
posted on the ad publishers' websites. We assume that both players are rational; 
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that is, they both aim to maximize their payoffs, and will choose the strategy 
which is the best response to the strategy chosen by the other player. The 
Attacker has two strategies, namely "to post a benign ad" (denoted as B) and "to 
post a malicious ad for distributing malware" (denoted as M). The Defender also 
has two strategies, namely "to inspect the submitted ad" (denoted as I) and "not 
to inspect the submitted ad" (denoted as No-I). 
  Next, we define the payoff functions for each possible combination of the 
two players' chosen strategies. The notations used in the payoff functions are 
defined as follows: 
 cm: Attacker's cost of launching malvertising. 
 ci: Defender's cost of inspecting online ads. 
 g: Attacker's gain of successful malware distribution through 
malvertising. We can assume that g > cm holds because otherwise the 
Attacker will not have sufficient motivation to post malicious ads. 
 l: Defender's loss due to undetected malvertising. We can assume that l > ci 
holds because otherwise the Defender will not have sufficient motivation 
to inspect submitted ads. 
 α: probability of Defender detecting malvertising, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. 
 
40 
 Figure 3.1 shows the matrix of the payoff functions under each possible 
combination of the two players' chosen strategies. In each square, the first value 
represents the Attacker's payoff, while the second value represents the 
Defender's payoff. Several payoff functions are straightforward, so we will only 
explain the payoff functions in the bottom left square. When the Attacker plays 
strategy M and the Defender plays strategy I, the Attacker incurs cost cm for 
launching malvertising but can get the gain g of successful malware distribution 
with probability 1-α; the Defender incurs inspection cost ci but can reduce the 
loss due to undetected malvertising by αl. 
Figure 3.1 Payoff functions of the game. 
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3.3 Finding Nash Equilibrium of the Game 
In this section, we discuss the Nash equilibria computed from the game theoretic 
model. We explain how to find the pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibria respectively. 
3.3.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
According to the payoff functions of each possible combination of strategy 
chosen by the Attacker and Defender as defined in Figure 3.1, we can compute 
the Nash equilibria of this game. To this end, we need to first determine the best 
response of each player toward each strategy chosen by the other player. 
  For the Attacker, we need to determine his best response to each of the 
Defender's two possible strategies, namely I and No-I, respectively. When the 
Defender plays I, we compare the Attacker's payoff for playing B, which is 0, and 
playing M, which is -cm+(1-α)g. If -cm+(1-α)g ≤ 0, which is equivalent to α ≥ 
    
 
, 
then B is Attacker's best response to Defender's strategy I. If -cm+(1-α)g ≥ 0, which 
is α ≤ 
    
 
, then M is Attacker's best response to Defender's strategy I. Note that 
when α = 
    
 
 , both B and M can be Attacker's best response to Defender's 
strategy I according to the definition of best response. When the Defender plays 
No-I, we compare the Attacker's payoff for playing B, which is 0, and playing M, 
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which is -cm+g. We can get -cm+g > 0 since g > cm. Thus, M is Attacker's dominant 
strategy to Defender's strategy No-I. 
 For the Defender, we need to determine his best response to each of the 
Attacker's two possible strategies, namely B and M, respectively. When the 
Attacker plays B, we compare Defender's payoff for playing I, which is -ci, and 
playing No-I, which is 0. Since cost ci must be positive, hence -ci < 0, we can get 
that No-I is Defender's dominant strategy to Attacker's strategy B. When the 
Attacker plays M, we compare the Defender's payoff for playing I, which is -ci-(1-
α)l, and playing No-I, which is -l. If -ci-(1-α)l-(-l) = -ci+αl ≥ 0, which is equivalent 
to α ≥ 
  
 
, then I is Defender's best response to Attacker's strategy M. If -ci+αl   0, 
which is α  
  
 
, then No-I is Defender's best response to Attacker's strategy M. 
Note that when α =  
  
 
 , both I and No-I can be Defender's best response to 
Attacker's strategy M according to the definition of best response. 
 From the best responses of both players discussed above we can 
determine the Nash equilibria of this game. If 
  
 
  α  
    
 
, then the strategy 
profile (M, I) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, because when this condition 
holds, strategy M is Attacker's best response to the Defender's strategy I, and 
strategy I is also the Defender's best response to the Attacker's strategy M. In the 
same way, we can derive that if α  
  
 
, then strategy profile (M, No-I) is a pure-
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strategy Nash equilibrium. However, if α > 
  
 
 and α > 
    
 
, then no pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium exists. This is because when one player chooses the best 
response strategy corresponding to the other player's chosen strategy, the latter 
player will shift to another strategy for it is the best response to the former 
player's chosen strategy, and then the former player will also shift to another 
strategy, which forms a loop as demonstrated in the example of the well-known 





    
 
, in which the Attacker and the Defender randomize their strategies 
instead of sticking to the same strategy at all times. 
3.3.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
Next, we show how to derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. 
As shown in Figure 3.2, we assume that the Attacker plays strategy B with 
probability x and plays strategy M with probability 1-x, and assume that the 
Defender plays strategy I with probability y and plays strategy No-I with 
probability 1-y. 
 To compute x, consider that the Attacker will randomize his choice of 
strategy to make Defender indifferent between I and No-I; that is, the expected 
payoff is the same for the Defender no matter he plays I or No-I.  From Figure 
3.2, we get 
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  x(-ci)+(1-x)(-ci-(1-α)l) = 0x-(1-x)l  
  x = 
     
  
     (3.1) 
 
 
 On the other hand, y can be computed with the consideration that the 
Defender will randomize his choice of strategy to make Attacker indifferent 
between B and M; that is, the expected payoff is the same for the Attacker no 
matter he plays B or M. From Figure 3.2, we get 
  y(-cm+(1-α)g)+(1-y)(-cm+g) = 0y-(1-y)0 = 0 
  y = 
    
  
     (3.2) 
Figure 3.2 Attacker and Defender randomize their choice of strategies. 
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 Therefore, we can derive that if α > 
  
 
 and α > 
    
 
, then the strategy 
profile {xB + (1-x)M, yI + (1-y)No-I} is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where 
probabilities x and y are as computed above. 
3.4 Evaluation and Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the evaluation and analysis of our game theoretic 
model. We developed a Python program to evaluate our model numerically. The 
variables needed in the numerical formula for pure and mixed strategy 
equilibrium are α, ci, cm, l and g. We have done the numerical simulations for the 
Defender's payoff and Attacker's payoff when one of these variables is varied 
with all the other variables assigned a fixed value. Note that the values used in 
the simulations are just for the purpose of providing examples and generating 
charts so that the effects of one variable on another variable can be observed. 
3.4.1 Simulations 
We give a brief overview of the purpose and results of each simulation as 
follows. In the first simulation, we aim to observe the effects of detection rate α 
on the Defender's payoff. We vary α from 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.05 and all 
the other parameters remain fixed to calculate the Defender's payoff. The values 
of the other parameters are chosen as follows: ci = 0.4, cm= 0.3, g = 0.9, and l is 
assigned three different values 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 in order to obtain three curves 
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based on l. Figure 3.3 shows that the Defender's payoff remains constant at -l 
when α ≤ 0.57 or  
  
 
, which corresponds to the first case of pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. When α > 0.57 and α ≤ 0.66 or 
    
 
, the Defender's payoff steadily 
increases. We see a switch from pure strategy to mixed strategy when α > 0.66. 
From this figure, we see that when the detection rate α is low, it has no effect on 
the Defender's payoff until α exceeds the first threshold (
  
 
   After that, the 
Defender's payoff increases as α continues to 
increase.
 
 In the second simulation, we aim to observe the effects of detection rate α 
on the Attacker's payoff. We vary α from 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.05 and all 
the other parameters remain fixed to calculate the Attacker's payoff. The values 
Figure 3.3 Variation in Defender's payoff with α. 
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of the other parameters are chosen as follows: ci = 0.4, cm= 0.3, l = 0.7, and g is 
assigned three different values 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 in order to obtain three curves 
based on g. Figure 3.4 shows that the Attacker's payoff remains constant at g - cm 
when α ≤ 0.57 or 
  
 
, which is the first case of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
When α > 0.57 and α ≤ 0.66 or 
    
 
, the Attacker's payoff sharply comes down to 
0.078 and then steadily decreases until it reaches zero. It remains constantly at 
zero when α > 0.66. From this figure, we see that when the detection rate α is low, 
it has no effect on the Attacker's payoff until α reaches the first threshold (
  
 
   
Then, there is a sharp drop in the Attacker's payoff. As α continues to increase, 
Attacker's payoff continues to decrease until it reaches zero.  
 
Figure 3.4 Variation in Attacker's payoff with α. 
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 In the third simulation, we aim to observe the effects of the Defender's 
cost ci on the Defender's payoff. We vary Defender's cost ci and all the other 
parameters remain fixed to calculate Defender's payoff. We vary ci from 0.0 to 
0.65 with a step size of 0.05 (ci stops at 0.65 since according to the assumption in 
Section 3.2, ci must be less than l, which is assigned as 0.7 here). The values for 
the other parameters were as follows: cm = 0.3, l = 0.7 and g = 0.9. The value of α is 
assigned 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 to obtain three different curves. We can see in Figure 3.5 that 
for all three curves, when α > 
  
 
, defender's payoff steadily decreases and reaches 




 Figure 3.6 shows the results for the simulation of Attacker's payoff vs. 
Attacker's cost cm. The fixed parameters ci, l, and g have the same values as in 
Figure 3.5 Variation in Defender's payoff with ci. 
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previous simulations, with only cm being varied from 0.0 to 0.85. The value of α is 
assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to obtain five different curves. We see that as the 
Attacker's cost cm increases, the payoff linearly decreases until it reaches 0. The 
starting point of each payoff curve (i.e. when cm = 0) depends on the value of the 
detection rate α. The higher the value of α, the lower the starting value of the 
payoff.  
 
 Figure 3.7 shows the results for the simulation of Defender's payoff vs. 
Defender's loss l. The fixed parameters cm, ci, and g have the same values as in 
previous simulations, with only l being varied from 0.45 to 1.25 (l starts from 0.45 
Figure 3.6 Variation in Attacker's payoff with cm. 
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since according to the assumption in Section 3.2, l should always be greater than 
ci, which is assigned as 0.4). The value of α is assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to 
obtain five curves. We see that as the Defender's loss l increases, the payoff 
linearly decreases. According to the Nash equilibria we derived, there is a switch 
of strategies for the Defender from No-I to I in the middle depending on the 
value of α. After the point of switch, the rate of decrease in the Defender's payoff 
slows down. The higher the value of α, the higher the change in the rate of 
decrease in the payoff. We see that when α = 0.7, the payoff becomes almost 
constant after the switch of strategies. 
 
Figure 3.7 Variation in Defender's payoff with l. 
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 Figure 3.8 shows the results for the simulation of Attacker's payoff vs. 
Attacker's gain g. The fixed parameters cm, ci, and l have the same values as in 
previous simulations, with only g being varied from 0.35 to 1.25. The value of α is 
assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to obtain five curves. We see that as g increases, the 
attacker's payoff always increases at a constant rate when α is lower (0.3, 0.4, or 
0.5). However, for a higher α (0.6 or 0.7), the payoff remains zero when g is not 
high enough, and starts to rise only when g is higher than a threshold.  
Figure 3.8 Variation in Attacker's payoff with g. 
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3.4.2 Analysis of the Game Theoretic Model 
From the analysis of the payoff functions of the Attacker and Defender, the 
conditions of each Nash equilibrium, and the results of above simulations, we 
can derive the following insights: 
1. This game is not a zero-sum game, because the Attacker's gain does not 
come from the Defender's loss.  
2. Although performing inspection (playing strategy I) will not bring the 
Defender any positive gain, it will lower his loss if he can detect the 
malicious ads with a sufficiently high rate. Therefore, the Defender is still 
motivated to inspect the submitted ads before letting them pass and be 
posted on ad publisher's website. 
3. If the detection rate is too low (α  
  
 
), then the Defender will just choose 
not to inspect the ads. This is because in this case the reduction of 
Defender's loss due to inspection is less than the cost spent on inspection, 
and thus will not lower the overall cost.  
4. If the detection rate is not high enough (α < 
    
 
), then the Attacker will 
always post malicious ads. This is because that although some malicious 
ads submitted by the Attacker will be detected by the Defender's 
inspection techniques, the gain brought in by those malicious ads 
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successfully delivered to vulnerable user machines is still higher than the 
cost of launching malvertising.  
5. If the detection rate is high enough (α > 
    
 
 and α > 
  
 
), then the Attacker 
and Defender start to randomize their choice of strategy because no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists. 
6. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in 
point 5 (i.e. α > 
    
 
 and α > 
  
 
). Provided that everything else is constant, 
higher α will make the Attacker incline more to post benign ads (from 
Equation (3.1) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that x increases when α 
increases), and make the Defender incline more to not inspect the ads 
(from Equation (3.2) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that y decreases when α 
increases). 
7. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in 
point 5, and the Defender has knowledge of the Attacker's average gain 
(g) resulting from each successful delivery of malicious ad. Provided that 
everything else is constant, higher g will make Defender incline more to 
inspect (from Equation (3.2) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that y increases 
when g increases). 
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8. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in 
point 5, and the Attacker has knowledge of the Defender's average loss (l) 
resulting from each undetected malicious ad. Provided that everything 
else is constant, higher l will make Attacker incline more to post benign 
ads (from Equation (3.1) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that x increases when l 
increases).  
3.5 Related Work 
Researchers have proposed complete defense systems to counter 
malvertisements as well. Ford et al. [45] developed a tool that can automatically 
analyze Flash advertisements to identify malicious behavior. Li et al. [46] 
presented MadTracer, a malvertising detection system based on machine 
learning techniques that learn and identify prominent features from malicious 
advertising nodes and their related content delivery paths. MadTracer can 
automatically generate detection rules and utilize them to detect malvertising 
activities. Rastogi et al. [47] developed a framework for analyzing the app-web 
interfaces in Android applications and successfully analyzed 201 ad networks 
and their associated ad library packages and 600,000 apps in the Google Play 
store and identified hundreds of malicious files and scam campaigns. Their 
scheme involves triggering of the app-web interfaces, detection of malicious 
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content, and provenance to identify the responsible parties. Arshad et al. [48] 
proposed an in-browser approach called Excision to automatically detect and 
block malicious third-party content inclusions as the user's browser loads web 
pages or executes browser extensions. They claimed that their approach does not 
rely on the inspection of the resources' content; rather, it relies on analyzing the 
sequence of inclusions that leads to the resolution and loading of a final third-
party resource. 
 Researchers have previously applied the game theoretic approach to 
combat other similar malicious threats. Njilla et al. [49] proposed a game 
theoretic framework to model the security and trust relationship in cyberspace 
among users, service providers and attackers. The authors formulated a three-
player game and analyzed different solutions obtained from Nash equilibrium 
that can benefit the service providers in decision making. Kamhoua et al. [50] 
proposed a game-theoretic approach for testing for hardware Trojans in digital 
circuits where the testing is modeled as a zero-sum game between malicious 
manufacturers or designers who want to insert Trojans, and testers whose goal is 
to detect the Trojans. The resulting solution involves multiple possible mixed 
strategy Nash equilibria that can provide guideline for optimum test sets for 
identifying and preventing hardware Trojans. Similar game theoretic approaches 
have been used in [51, 52, 53, 54].  
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3.6 Summary  
Malvertising has posed serious security threats to the Internet, and caused losses 
to Internet users and ad networks alike. In this work, we formulated the 
malvertising inspection problem with a game theoretic model, and introduced a 
normal form game between the malvertiser and the ad network. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply game theory to model this 
problem. We computed pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for the 
two players, and derived several useful insights from analysis of the game. Our 
findings can provide guidelines for ad networks to best utilize their resources to 
mitigate the problem of malvertising. 
 In the future, we aim to extend our game theoretic model to consider the 
repeated Bayesian game between the malvertiser and the ad network. The main 
characteristic of a Bayesian game is that one or both of the players have 
incomplete information about the type of the other player, which will allow us to 
model the scenario when the ad network has incomplete information to 
determine whether the advertiser belongs to the benign type or the malicious 
type. Moreover, repeated game will allow the players to incorporate the 
information they learned in previous games into the playing of future games.
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CHAPTER  4 
MAXIMIZING ACCURACY IN MULTI-SCANNER MALWARE 
DETECTION SYSTEMS 
4.1 Problem Formulation 
In this section, we have formulated the problem of maximizing accuracy in a 
multi-scanner detection system using appropriate formal notations. Table 4.1 
lists some of these notations used in the formulation. Formally, the problem of 
maximizing accuracy in a multi-scanner detection system can be stated as 
follows: 
 Given N scanners along with their respective (true positive and false 
positive) detection rates or probabilities Pi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ N) and binary detection 
results (either true or false) for a given sample obtained from these N scanners., 
how can we find the optimum value of T (1 ≤ T ≤ N) where T is the threshold to 
decide maliciousness of that given sample. Here, we assume the N is a finite 
number and we only have the detection rates or probabilities associated with 




Table 4.1 Notations 
 
Symbol Description 
I Input to the multi-scanner system 
Oi Output of ith scanner (0 or 1) 
N Total number of scanners 
Q Optimum number of scanners to achieve maximum 
accuracy 
T Threshold to decide the maliciousness of an object 
Pi Detection probability of  ith scanner 
PTi The probability of classifying a malicious object as 
malicious by  ith scanner 
PFi The probability of classifying a benign object as malicious 
by  ith scanner 
CP(t) Combined detection probability when T = t 
 
  
 The problem can be extended further to answer the following questions:  
1) Assuming that N is the total number of scanners that we can use and Q is the 
optimum number of scanners to achieve maximum accuracy, what is the 
relationship between N and Q? Is N = Q always holds, or Q < N can also be true? 
In other words, does adding another scanner always improve accuracy? 
2) If M is the size of a subset of all N scanners, how do we select these M scanners 
to achieve maximum accuracy that is possible for any subset of scanners of size 
M. In other words, given that there can be   
 
  of combinations possible, how can 
we rank all the scanners to select the best M scanners such that it will provide 
maximum accuracy among all these combinations possible?  
 
59 
4.2 Combined Probability Model (CPM) 
In this section, we will explain the development of the Combined Probability Model 
(CPM) in detail. As mentioned earlier, we have devised a set of formula to 
construct the model. In the formulas, we used certain symbols and notations to 
denote various terms. Table 4.1 lists these notations. To help better understand 
the model, we will start with a small scaled model consisting only 3 scanners. 
Then, we will extend the small scaled model to a more generalized version.  
4.2.1 3-Scanner CPM 
We start with a simple 3-scanner model (N=3) to better illustrate and explain the 
method of developing the generalized model. The most generic multi-scanner 
system consisting 3 scanners should be a parallel system of scanners, depicted as 
in Figure 4.1. A parallel system of scanners is a system of scanners where each 
input sample is fed to all the scanners in parallel and at the same time. We 
Figure 4.1 A 3-scanner parallel system. 
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assume here that all the scanners are binary scanners, i.e. they produce an output 
of either 1 or 0, where a 1-output means the sample is detected as malicious and 
0-output means the sample is detected as benign.  
 To decide maliciousness of an input object, we have 3 choices here. We 
can label the object as malicious if (i) all three scanners label it as malicious, (ii) 
any two of them label it as malicious, or (iii) any one of them labels it as 
malicious. This is equivalent to considering the value of T as 3, 2 and 1 
respectively.  
 Now, there are two distinct probabilities associated with each scanner – PT 
and PF. PT is used to calculate the overall true positive probability and PF is used 
to calculate the overall false positive probability. For the sake of generality, we 
will only use the notation P to denote a particular probability here.  
 To understand how we can come up with the equations, we have to break 
down each case into smaller parts. For example, if we consider T = 1, this means 
that if any single scanner detects the sample, we can consider that sample as 
detected and label it as malicious. Now, let us assume X denotes the random 
variable that is defined as the number of scanners that detect a given sample as 
malicious. Then, for T = 1, the combined probability can be derived as 
              
which in turn can be written as 
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 In other words, the probability of a sample being detected by at least one 
scanner is a summation of the probability of that sample being detected by 
exactly 1, 2 and 3 scanners. This is also depicted in Figure 4.2(a), where we can 
see the total white region consists of three types of smaller regions which depict 
three components of the summation in the above equation. Therefore, we can 
generalize this equation for T = t (where 1 ≤ t ≤ 3) as  
                
 
   
                                  
 Now, we have to find out how to calculate the probability P{X=i}. Let's 
start with P{X=1}. This means, we have to calculate the probability that exactly 
one scanner will detect the sample. We have the individual detection 









Figure 4.2 Venn diagrams for the three cases. 
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P{X=1} can be described as the summation of the probabilities that only scanner 1 
detects the sample, only scanner 2 detects the sample and only scanner 3 detects 
the sample. Now, according to the rules of probabilities, we can say that the 
probability that only scanner 1 detects the sample is P1(1-P2)(1-P3). Similarly, for 
scanner 2 and scanner 3 the probabilities will be P2(1-P3)(1-P1) and P3(1-P1)(1-P2)  
respectively. Therefore, we can write 
 
                       
                                              
                                                                               
 
Following similar reasoning, we can write  
  
                   
                                         




                                                                                                            
 
The reasoning behind these equations is also illustrated in Figure 4.2. Replacing 
the values from equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) into equation (4.1), we can easily 




4.2.2 N-Scanner CPM 
In the previous section, we limited our discussion to only 3 scanners for ease of 
understanding. Now, we can extend this 3-scanner model to an N-scanner 
model. Figure 4.3 shows an N-scanner system.  
 For an N-scanner model with T = t (where 1 ≤ t ≤ N), equation (4.1) 
becomes  
                
 
   
                                             
Based on equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), we can come up with a generalized N-
scanner equation for the probability P{X=i} as   
           
 
 
   
    
   




     
                 
where   
 
 is the probability of  the scanner with index k (1 ≤ k ≤ i) in jth 
combination in   
 
  and   
 
 is the probability of the scanner with index l (i+1 ≤ l ≤ 
Figure 4.3 An N-scanner parallel system. 
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N) in all the other scanners that are not in jth combination. Substituting the value 
of P{X=i} from equation (4.6) into equation (4.5) we get  
            
 
 
   
    
   




     
 
 
   
                     
Equation (4.7) can be used as the generic N-scanner equation for combined 
detection probability when T = t. 
4.2.3 CPM for Other Multi-Scanner Systems 
So far we have considered only parallel system of scanners. In this section, we 
will discuss other types of multi-scanner systems such as the serial system and 
the mixed system and show how they only are special cases of the parallel 
system of scanners.  
4.2.3.1 Serial System 
A serial system of scanners is a system of scanners where all the scanners are 
connected serially, as depicted in Figure 4.4. The input sample is fed into the first 
scanner and the output from the first scanner is fed into the second scanner and 
so on. Again, we consider only binary outputs from the scanners. Therefore, by 
feeding the output into the next scanner, we mean that if the sample is detected 
as malicious (a 1-output), the sample is passed onto the next scanner to be 
scanned. This process goes on until the scanner is utilized and only if all the 
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scanner detect this sample as malicious, it is finally classified as malicious. On 
the other hand, if the sample is detected as benign ( a 0-output), the sample is not 
passed onto the next scanner and all the subsequent scanners automatically 
report that sample as benign, eventually classifying the sample as benign.  
 
 If we compare this system with the parallel system of scanners, we can 
easily see that this serial system of scanners is nothing but a special case of the 
parallel system of scanners, where the threshold value T is fixed at the total 
number of scanners N. This means, only when all the scanners detect a specific 
sample as malicious, the sample is classified as malicious. In all the other cases, 
the sample is classified as benign. Therefore, we can use equation (4.7) by just 
substituting t with N and calculating CP(N).   
 An alternative version of the serial system is also possible where instead 
of passing the sample to the next scanner when it is detected as malicious and 
blocking it when it is detected as benign, we can block it when it is detected as 
malicious and pass it to the next scanner when it is detected as benign. In this 
Figure 4.4 An N-scanner serial system. 
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case, the sample will be detected benign only when all the scanners have 
detected it as benign and it will be detected as malicious if a single scanner 
detects it as malicious. Again, if we compare this alternative serial system with 
the parallel one, we find that this is nothing but a special case of the parallel 
system where the threshold value T is fixed at the value of 1. Therefore, we can 
use equation (4.7) to calculate CP(1).  
4.2.3.2 Mixed System 
So far, we have seen only pure parallel and serial system of scanners. There also 
can be a third type of multi-scanner system, where there are both parallel and 
serial parts in the system. We can call them a mixed system. Consider the 
systems depicted in Figure 4.5 for a 3-scanner system. The system shown in 
Figure 4.5(a) has scanner 1 and scanner 2 connected serially, and scanner 3 is 
parallel to the serial system of scanner 1 and scanner 2. This system is in fact a 
parallel system of scanners where one line in the parallel system is a serial 




system, which is also a special type of parallel system as we established in 
section 4.1.3.1. Therefore, we can say that the mixed system is a parallel system 
consisting of other smaller parallel systems. This means, we can use the same 
equation (4.7) that we derived for parallel systems to derive the equation for a 
particular mixed system. Figure 4.5(b) shows another variation of 3-scanner 
mixed system. For an N-scanner system, obviously there can be many more 
variations possible.   
4.3 Greedy Heuristic Based Models 
4.3.1 Greedy Approximation Model (GAM) 
Instead of deriving a mathematical formula, the Greedy Approximation Model 
(GAM) applies the greedy heuristic to approximately calculate the combined 
probability CP(t) for a given threshold t. Here, the greedy heuristic is to start by 
combining the highest t individual detection probabilities and moving along in a 
decreasing order doing the same until less than t probabilities available. An 
example would better explain the approach. Let's say we have P1, P2, P3 ... PN 
individual detection probabilities available sorted in a decreasing order, that is, 
P1 ≥ P2 ≥ P3 ≥ ... ≥ PN. To calculate CP(t), we initialize CP(t) to 0 and calculate P1 × 
P2 × P3 × ... × Pt and add to CP(t). For the next iteration, we calculate 1 - CP(t) and 
multiply it with P2 × P3 × P4 × ... × Pt+1 and add the result to CP(t). This goes on till 
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we add PN-t+1 × PN-t+2 × PN-t+3 × ... × PN × (1 - CP(t)) to CP(t). The final value of CP(t) is 
our desired combined detection probability. We developed the Greedy 
Approximation algorithm based on this approach, as shown in Figure 4.6. Here, 
the parameters Lp and t refer to the list of individual detection probabilities and 
threshold respectively and the resulting combined probability is denoted by CPt. 
4.3.2 Complementary Greedy Approximation Model (CGAM) 
The Complementary Greedy Approximation Model (CGAM) applies a similar greedy 
heuristic approach. But instead of applying it on the detection probabilities, it is 
applied on the complements of the probabilities and again complemented to find 
the desired combined probability. To understand the reasoning behind this 
approach, we have to refer back to the Venn diagrams in Figure 4.2. In Figure 
Figure 4.6 The Greedy Approximation algorithm. 
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4.2(a), we can clearly see that the combined probability of P1, P2 and P3 is shown 
by the total white region. The area of this white region can be calculated in 
another way also, that is, by subtracting area of the total grey region from the 
area of the rectangle. Here, the area of the rectangle represents 1, since this is the 
universal set, and the area of the grey region is the combined probability of the 
complements of the probabilities, namely, (1-P1), (1-P2) and (1-P3). Figure 4.7 
shows the Complementary Greedy Approximation algorithm.  
 
4.4 Accuracy Metrics 
The simplest metric is called Accuracy (ACC) or Fraction Correct (FC) [55]. It 
measures the fraction of all instances that are correctly categorized and is defined 
by  
      
     
           
 
Figure 4.7 The Complementary Greedy Approximation algorithm. 
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where TP, TN, FP, and FN refers to true positive, true negative, false positive, 
and false negative respectively. In our experiments, we only calculate TP and FP. 
But TP and FN together make the total number of malicious samples. Similarly, 
TN and FP together makes the total number of benign samples. Therefore, we 
can easily calculate FN and TN from TP and FP. 
 Another useful metric is the F1 score [56]. It considers both precision and 
recall of the test to compute the score and is defined by  
     
   
            
      
A third metric, called the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [57], is used in 
machine learning as measure of quality of binary classifications. It is generally 
regarded as a balanced measure and is defined by  
      
                 
                             
    
4.5 Ranking of Scanners 
To identify the best subset of scanners for a given size M out of N (1 ≤ M ≤ N), we 
need to rank the scanners based on a suitable criteria that can help in achieving 
the maximum accuracy and select the top M scanners. But the only information 
about the scanners is their detection rates. Therefore, we need to create an 
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individual scoring system based on the true positive and false positive detection 
probabilities for each scanner. Here, we propose to use the accuracy formula 
(ACC) from section 4.4. Then, individual score for scanner i should be,  
    si 
  
      
 
 
                                 (8) 
 Based on this score, we can sort all the N scanners in a descending order. 
Then, to get M best scanners, we can select top M scanners from the ordered set 
of N scanners. 
4.6 Numerical Simulation 
To verify the accuracy of our models and to answer the questions mentioned in 
section 4.1, we performed several numerical simulation experiments. We used 
Python to develop small programs that can simulate the scanning of a set of 
samples by a set of anti-virus scanners. In this section, we will describe the setup 
of these experiments and their results in detail.  
4.6.1 Simulation of the Models 
We defined a hypothetical set of 1000 malicious and 1000 benign samples and 10 
anti-virus scanners. We randomly decided whether a particular sample is 
detected as malicious or not by a particular anti-virus scanner. Then, we 
calculated the true positive rate and false positive rate for each anti-virus scanner 
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as well as the combined true positive rate and false positive rate for all the 
threshold values ranging from 1 to 10. We did the same using our models as 
well. Then, we calculated the accuracy values both for the actual case and for our 
models based on three metrics of evaluation, as described in section 4.4. 
 As mentioned earlier, we randomly decided whether a sample is detected 
as malicious or not by an anti-virus scanner. To create different test sets with 
different detection rates for the anti-virus scanners, we enforced different 
maximum values so that all the anti-virus scanners will have a detection rate that 
is below the maximum value for that test set. This means, for example, if the 
maximum value is 90, all the anti-virus scanners (10 in our experiments) will 
have a maximum detection rate of 0.9 or 90%. We varied the maximum value to 
create all the test sets spanning all possible detection rates. The range of 
maximum values for true positive rates was from 50 to 95 and the range of 
maximum values for false positive rates was from 5 to 50. 
 To better illustrate our simulation results, we show the graphs of one 
specific test case, where the true positive rate was limited to 80% and the false 
positive rate was limited to 10%. Figure 4.8(a) shows the graphs of combined true 
positive rates generated from the actual case and the models for different 
threshold values ranging from 1 to 10. Similarly, Figure 4.8(b) shows the graphs 
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combined false positive rates calculated from actual case and our models for 
different threshold values. 
 
 Figure 4.9 shows the comparison of accuracy values resulting from the 
actual values estimated using the actual optimum threshold and also using the 






threshold calculated from our models for the example test case using three 
different evaluation metrics. We have also included the minimum accuracy levels 
to show how our model predicated accuracy values perform against them. The 
graph clearly indicates that all of the model predicted accuracy values are very 
close to the actual maximum accuracy values.   
 
   To evaluate how our models perform against the actual cases, we varied 
the limiting maximum values for randomization and created different test cases. 
As mentioned earlier, the range of limiting maximum values for true positive 
rates was from 50 to 95 and the range for false positive rates was from 5 to 50. We 
varied the values with a step size of 5, creating total 10 × 10 = 100 test cases. Table 
4.2 shows average deviation from the actual maximum accuracy value for all 
Figure 4.9 Comparison of accuracy values using three evaluation metrics 
based on simulation results. 
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three models based on three evaluation metrics we used. Results from Table 4.2 
indicate that CPM performs best among the models.    
Table 4.2 Average Deviation from Maximum Accuracy 
 
Metric Used CPM GAM CGAM 
ACC 0.03 0.1 0.14 
F1 0.04 0.12 0.15 
MCC 0.06 0.18 0.26 
 
4.6.2 Simulation of Optimum Size for Scanner Set (Q) 
The optimum size of the scanner set refers to the number of scanners in a scanner 
set that achieves the maximum accuracy value among all available N scanners. 
We have denoted it here as Q. Here, the goal of our simulation test is to 
determine whether adding new scanners to a multi-scanner system can always 
improve or maintain the maximum accuracy. In other words, if we have a total of 
N scanners available, we want to answer the following question - should we use 
all of them to achieve maximum accuracy (Q = N), or is it possible to reduce the 
number of scanners needed to achieve maximum accuracy by removing some 
scanners from the set (Q < N)? 
 In the simulation test, we vary the average false positive detection rate of 
the scanners and calculate the value of Q. The value of N is selected as 10 like 
before. The value of average false positive rate is varied from 0.01 to 0.1 with a 
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step size of 0.01. We run the tests for each average false positive rate value 100 
times to get an average estimate. Figure 4.10 (a) shows the percentage of times Q 
is less than N out of all instances as we increase the average false positive rate of 
scanners.  
 





 We can see from the graph that the increase is almost linear and it 
increases up to more than 50% when the average false positive rate is increased 
up to 0.1. Figure 4.10 (b) shows the calculated average values of Q when N is 10, 
as we increase the average false positive rate. The graph shows that the average 
value of Q almost linearly decreases with the increase in average false positive 
rate. Both of these graphs in Figure 4.10 verifies the fact that if the false positive 
rate of the scanners are high enough, the number of scanners that will yield the 
maximum accuracy can be lower than the total number of available scanners. In 
other words, with a high enough false positive rate, it is not always beneficial to 
add new scanners to the set of scanners in a multi-scanner system. 
4.6.3 Simulation of the Ranking Approach 
In section 4.5, we proposed a ranking system based on the accuracy score of 
individual scanners to rank all the scanners and take top M to create a subset of 
scanners. We performed simulation experiments to test how the performance of 
this ranked subset fit into the range of maximum accuracy values achieved by 
any M scanner subset.  
 Figure 4.11 shows the graph for a sample simulation test done to compare 
the maximum accuracy values achieved by best combination, worst combination 
and the combination consisting of top ranked scanners. The individual scanner 
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true positive and false positive detection rates were randomized like the 
previous simulation tests and were limited to a highest value. In this test case, 
true positive rates were limited to 80% and false positive rates were limited to 
5%. We can see from the graph that our ranking approach does much better than 
the worst combination selected and performs almost at the same level as the best 
combination for higher M values.   
 
 We executed similar simulation test 100 times to get an average estimate 
of how our ranking approach performs. We found that on average our ranking 
approach provides a combination that achieves a accuracy value  that is 0.0195 
lower than the maximum accuracy achieved by the best combination and 0.0655 
Figure 4.11 Comparison of maximum accuracy by best, worst and ranked 
best combinations based on simulation results. 
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higher than the maximum achieved by the worst combination. Here, we have 
only included the evaluation results done using the first metric (ACC). Similar 
evaluation could be done using the other two metrics as well.  
4.7 Experimental Evaluation Using Real Data 
4.7.1 Malware and Goodware Dataset 
 We collected a large data set of malware samples from VirusSign [58], which 
generously provides with a significant amount of malware samples everyday in 
return of a small payment. Our malware dataset consisted 38,789 malware 
samples in total. Our goodware dataset consisted of 21624 benign portable 
executable (PE) binary files collected from SourceForge [59]. We downloaded 
these files by crawling the SourceForge website in order of user rating to ensure 
they are not malicious. Table 4.3 lists the details of each of the malware and 
goodware datasets.  
Table 4.3 Malware and Goodware Dataset 
 
Name Source Number of 
Samples 




VirusSign 38,789 April 26 to April 29, 2014 
Goodware 
Dataset 




 We divided both the malware and goodware dataset further into training 
and test sets. The training datasets are used to calculate individual true and false 
detection probabilities (PT and PF) for each anti-virus scanner. These values are 
used by our models to calculate combined detection probabilities (CPT(t) and 
CPF(t)) according to our CPM formula (equation (4.7)) and GAM and CGAM 
algorithms. Then, the test datasets are used to calculate the actual combined 
detection probabilities (CPT(t) and CPF(t)) for each threshold t. Table 4.4 lists the 
division of malware and goodware dataset into corresponding training sets and 
test sets. We used multiple test sets of varying sizes by dividing the full test set to 
add diversity into the experiments.  
Table 4.4 Training and Test Sets 
 
Name Number of Samples 
Malware Training Set 28,789 
Malware Test Set 10,000 
Goodware Training Set 11,624 
Goodware Test Set 10,000 
 
4.7.2 Experimental Setup 
We used online multi-scanning service VirusTotal for our experiments. 
VirusTotal generates scanning reports based on scanning performed by at most 
55 anti-virus scanners (at the time of the writing). But not all the reports contain 
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the same anti-virus scanners all the time. This is why we had to identify a set of 
anti-virus scanners that are common to all the generated scanning reports. We 
found that 21 anti-virus scanners (listed in Table 4.5) were common to all the 
scanning reports. 
























 To implement the experiment, we developed a small program in C#.NET 
that is based on the VirusTotal API to generate the scanning reports from 
VirusTotal and another small program in Python to parse and calculate our 
desired combined detection probability and accuracy values from them. We also 
implemented our models using Python.   
4.7.3 Results and Analysis 
 
Figure 4.12(a) shows the graphs of combined true positive detection probability 
(CPT(t)) against threshold values (t) from 1 to 21. Here, we have divided the full 
test set (both malware and goodware) into 5 test sets containing 2000 samples 
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each. From the graphs, we can see that the actual combined true positive 
detection rate varies from test to test. Among the graphs generated from the 
models, CPM shows least amount of deviation from the actual trend. The other 
two (GAM and CGAM) graphs deviate further in opposite directions. A similar 
trend can be found in Figure 4.12(b), which demonstrates the graphs of 
combined false positive detection probabilities (CPF(t))  against threshold values 
(t) from 1 to 21. 
 We use these combined true and false positive detection probabilities to 
calculate accuracy values according to three evaluation metrics from section 4.4 
and use them to determine the optimum threshold.  To add diversity in test sizes, 
we created 3 test sets from the malware and goodware test set according to Table 
4.6. Figure 4.13 shows the comparative graphs for these accuracy values for each 
test set. The accuracy values calculated using the models are actually the actual 
accuracy values for the model predicted optimum thresholds. Figure 4.13(a), 
4.13(b) and 4.13(c) presents the comparative accuracy values for test set 1, test set 
2 and test set 3 respectively. We can see that for all the test cases, the model 
predicted accuracy values are very close to actual maximum accuracy values. We 
also see that there is a very small difference in accuracy values among CPM, 





Figure 4.12 Comparison of graphs of combined detection probabilities 






Figure 4.13 Comparison of accuracy values using three evaluation 






Table 4.6 Distribution of Test Sets for Combined Accuracy Test 
 
Test Set 
Number of  
Malware Samples 
Number of Goodware 
Samples 
1 4000 4000 
2 4000 2000 
3 2000 4000 
 
 Next, we perform all combination tests where we take a subset of M 
scanners from all N scanners and calculate maximum accuracy values for the best 
combination, the worst combination and the combination from top ranked 
scanners. Figure 4.14 shows the graphs for this experiment done only on the test 
set 1 from Table 4.6. The results for test set 2 and 3 also yield similar results and 
omitted for space constraints. In Figure 4.14, we see that the ranking approach 
yields accuracy values that are very close to the maximum accuracy values 
achieved by the best combination and much higher than the maximum accuracy 
achieved by the worst combination. We have also calculated an average among 
all 3 test sets to find out the average difference of the accuracy values for the 
combinations. We found that on average the maximum accuracy value calculated 
using the ranking approach is lower than the maximum accuracy for the best 
combination by 0.00164 and higher than the maximum accuracy for the worst 




 Another important observation from Figure 4.14 is that the accuracy 
values tend to always increase with the increase of M. This is because the average 
false positive rate for all the scanners is 0.00864 which is lower than 0.01. This 
also verifies our simulation results from section 4.6.2, where we have seen that 
for very low average false positive rates; Q is almost equal to N and the 
probability of Q being lower than N is very low. 
4.7.4 Runtime Analysis and Comparison of the Models 
A comparison of the models in terms of runtime analysis is given in Table 4.7 
and as you can see, CPM is far worse than both GAM and CGAM based on this 
criterion. The main reason behind this is obviously the combinatorial component 
Figure 4.14 Comparison of maximum accuracy by best, worst and ranked 
best combinations based on real world dataset. 
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in the formula for CPM. We have calculated actual execution time from our 
experiments for each model as well, which is also listed in Table 4.7. The 
execution time has been calculated in an Intel Core i3 2.10 GHz laptop for a 
scenario where N was assigned 20. We see that CPM takes almost more than 6 
minutes to execute, whereas GAM and CGAM takes about 1 millisecond. This 
means, CPM is not the best choice in terms of scalability and the greedy 
approximation algorithms provide a good alternative. If we want to reduce the 
execution time even more, we can consider using a subset of M scanners instead 
of all N scanners, where M < N. If we want to make the best tradeoff between 
scalability and accuracy, GAM should be our best choice. 
Table 4.7 Comparison of the Models 
 




   










4.8 Related Work 
4.8.1 Multi-scanner Architecture 
Very few research papers have been published that focus solely on combining 
multiple scanners to achieve higher accuracy. Morales et al. [60] investigated 
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whether a single anti-malware program is sufficient to detect and clean all 
malware present on a system. They experimentally showed that a single anti-
malware program is not sufficient. Their experiments used a combination of 3 
well known anti-malware programs in different permutations and they followed 
a serial architecture. Though in a limited fashion, their results showed that 
combining multiple anti-malware programs achieve better recall and false 
negative rates. Oberheide et al. [61] presented a new model for malware 
detection on end hosts based on providing anti-virus as an in-cloud network 
service. Their model used multiple, heterogeneous detection engines in parallel, 
a technique termed as `N-version protection'. They claimed that their approach 
provides several benefits including better detection of malicious software, 
enhanced forensics capabilities, retrospective detection, and improved 
deployability and management. To verify their model, they constructed and 
deployed an in-cloud antivirus system called CloudAV. CloudAV includes a 
lightweight, cross-platform host agent and a network service with ten anti-virus 
engines and two behavioral detection engines. They evaluated the performance, 
scalability, and efficacy of the system using data from a real-world deployment 
lasting more than six months and a database of 7220 malware samples covering a 
one year period. The results showed that CloudAV provides 35% better detection 
coverage against recent threats compared to a single anti-virus engine and a 98% 
 
89 
detection rate across the full dataset. Cukier et al. [62] presented empirical 
evidence that detection capabilities are considerably improved by diversity with 
AVs and their findings also showed that none of the single anti-virus software 
achieved perfect detection rate. 
 4.8.2 Collaborative Malware Detection 
There has been some research on the collaborative approach in detecting 
malware. Schmidt et al. [63] presented a collaborative malware detection 
approach to reduce false negative rate for Android-based malware detection by 
performing static analysis of executables and sharing detection information 
among neighboring nodes. Fung et al. [64] presented a collaborative decision 
making approach for malware detection systems. They proposed a decision 
model called RevMatch [65], where collaborative malware detection decisions 
are made based on the scanning history with multiple anti-virus systems. They 
claimed that the experimental evaluation of their model shows significant 
improvement over any single anti-virus engine. RAVE [66] is a centralized 
collaborative malware scanning system for email infrastructures where email 
correspondence is used to contact multiple agents for malware scanning and a 
voting mechanism is used to make the final decisions. Marchetti et al. [67] 
presented a distributed peer-to-peer architecture for collaborative malware and 
intrusion detection focusing more on dependability and load-balancing issues. 
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Similar approach was proposed by Colajanni et al. [68]. Lu et al. [69] presented 
SCMA, a distributed malware analysis system with the goal of better 
collaboration and scalability.  
4.8.3 Multi-AV Scanning Services and Software 
There are free online public services that provide scanning reports from multiple 
anti-virus scanners. VirusTotal [8], a Google subsidiary, is the most prominent 
among these services. VirusTotal uses the command-line versions of 55 anti-virus 
scanners (at the time of writing) to scan a single file and include the results 
returned by each scanner into an aggregated report. In addition to telling 
whether a given anti-virus solution detected a submitted file, it displays the exact 
detection label returned by each engine. This service is mainly useful to the anti-
virus vendors and to those private users who wants a second opinion. Among 
other such services, there are Jotti [70], VirSCAN [71], File2Scan [72], and 
Metadefender [73], where File2Scan and Metadefender are paid services. There 
are also multi-AV scanning client tools such as HerdProtect [74], HitmanPro [75], 
SecureAPlus [76], and Multi-AV [77].  
4.8.4 Commercial AV Scanners 
Most of the anti-virus vendors use their own proprietary malware detection 
engine which usually includes a signature database, a heuristic-based detection 
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engine, and a reputation-based detection system. A few of them, namely 
Emsisoft [78] and G Data [79], use a dual-engine technology where each scan 
passes through two engines. 
4.9 Summary  
With the ever increasing amount of activities in the Internet and the world 
moving into an era of cloud computing, the protection from malicious content 
remains a top priority of cyber security. And the first step in this protection 
mechanism is detection of malware and other malicious content. In this chapter, 
we provided a new set of guidelines in achieving the optimum detection 
capabilities of malware using multiple anti-virus scanners. We have presented 
three theoretical models to capture the behavior of a multi-scanning malware 
detection system based on only the individual detection capabilities or ratings of 
the member scanners in the system. These models help us in finding the 
optimum threshold to achieve maximum accuracy in an N-scanner system, 
which our experimental evaluation verifies. Furthermore, we discovered that 
with high enough false positive rates, addition of new scanners might be 
disadvantageous and ranking the scanners based on accuracy scores is a good 
approximation for finding a best subset of scanners. All of these findings along 
with our models together make up a set of important guidelines for any multi-
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scanner detection system consisting of only third-party anti-virus scanners where 
very little information is available about them, such as VirusTotal.  
 In future, we anticipate further extending this work into other areas of 
malicious content detection, such as intrusion detection and anti-spam filtering. 
Our models do not take into account any specific detail of a single scanner or 
filter, rather take them as black boxes and only take into account their detection 
probabilities based on prior detection history. Even the past detection history 
does not have to be available at hand. Only an approximate or calculated 
detection rate or quality score is necessary. Therefore, incorporating the intrusion 
detection or anti-spam filters instead of an anti-virus scanner into a multi-filter 
system is quite straight forward. The only difficulty here is that there is no 
existing multi-filter system of intrusion detection or anti-spam filters currently 
available like VirusTotal or other multi-AV scanning services. We intend to 
include an extensive experimental evaluation of our models based on popular 




CHAPTER  5 
DETECTION OF HTTP-BASED BOTNET C&C TRAFFIC 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we introduce an anomaly detection based approach to detect 
HTTP-based botnet C&C communication which focuses on how to prevent the 
botnet from upgrading itself to avoid detection. That means, we want to make it 
very hard for the botmaster to mimic the legitimate HTTP communication and 
hide C&C activities. Our approach is based on identifying anomaly in client 
generated HTTP request packets as well as DNS server generated response 
packets for the same HTTP communication. Based on some initial analysis of 
both legitimate and botnet C&C HTTP traffic, we have selected some statistical 
features that are suitable for detecting anomaly in a large set of captured HTTP 
traffic. These features are based on patterns emerging from HTTP request 
packets, more specifically, the URL string that is used to fetch data from an 
HTTP server. Using these features we primarily run an unsupervised anomaly 
detection algorithm to distinguish between HTTP request packets generated by 
human actions and HTTP request packets generated by a software bot, both 
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legitimate and malicious. Then, to further narrow down the isolated packets, we 
extract the primary domain names involved in those packets and run a semi-
supervised anomaly detection algorithm using a selected set of features based on 
the DNS server response packets that particularly contain resolved IP address list 
(A or AAAA record). Eventually, we are left with a list of domain names that are 
highly probable to be involved in malicious C&C communication. 
5.2 Details of Methodology 
HTTP botnets try to hide their C&C communication in the massive HTTP traffic 
generated and transmitted over the Internet everyday by mimicking the 
behaviors of a legitimate Web communication. Our idea is to find the features 
that are very hard for the botnets to mimic and use those features to effectively 
isolate the C&C traffic. Therefore, the first step in our method is to select the 
feature set. We have selected a feature set based on HTTP request URL field and 
DNS response packet fields. Then, we apply anomaly detection algorithms on 
the feature set in unsupervised (for HTTP request URL) and semi-supervised (for 
DNS response) fashion. There are two stages in the anomaly detection part. In 
the first stage, our goal is to isolate the software-agent-generated HTTP packets 
from the browser-generated HTTP packets resulting from human browsing 
activities. For this purpose, we focus on the HTTP request URL patterns. Here, 
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the motivation of our approach is that human browsing activities tend to 
generate diverse and noisy HTTP traffic, whereas the software-agent-generated 
automated HTTP traffic tends to follow certain algorithms written by the 
software developer. In other words, browser-generated HTTP traffic can be 
regarded as human-generated manual traffic, where the human user effectively 
types or clicks through the URLs; on the other hand, the software-agent-
generated HTTP traffic can be regarded as non-human-generated bot-like traffic, 
where the software agent acts like a bot. Here, we should mention that the 
browser itself can also act like a software agent or bot and generate bot-like 
traffic and we have considered this into our approach. In the second stage, the 
goal is to isolate the botnet C&C domains from the legitimate Web domains. 
There are two steps in this stage. In the first step, we extract the primary domains 
from all the IP addresses. The concept of primary domain is discussed later in 
this section. In the second step, we extract the DNS response features from the 
dataset for each domain. Then we apply one anomaly detection algorithm 
(Chebyshev's inequality) to this set, along with our training dataset, in a semi-
supervised fashion. Figure 5.1 shows the steps in our method and we describe 





5.2.1 Feature Selection 
1) HTTP Request URL Features 
The HTTP request URL features are used to isolate the human-generated manual 
HTTP traffic and non-human-generated automated HTTP traffic. 
Figure 5.1 The main steps in our detection process. 
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a) Total number of distinct URLs 
Automated HTTP traffic usually has a lower value for this feature, unless they 
either generate a distinct URL every time or use many dummy URLs that 
effectively point to the same set of original URLs. In the latter cases, the value 
can be too high. Human users usually visit many distinct URL for the same 
website, which means the value should be high but within a certain limit. Using 
this feature in our detection method, we can make the botmaster to work a bit 
harder to mimic normal traffic and hide their activities.  
b) Frequencies of request URLs 
It is hard to come up with a frequency pattern that mimics human browsing 
activities. Normally a software agent either will reuse the same URL over and 
over again or generate a distinct URL every time. We use the mean and the 
standard deviation values for the set of frequencies as features into the anomaly 
detection algorithm. 
c) Lengths of request URLs 
 To make it even harder for the botmaster to generate pseudo-browsing pattern 
that resembles human browsing pattern, we take the request URL lengths into 
account. A website usually has a hierarchy of web pages with distinct names, 
which makes all the request URLs different in length. On the other hand, 
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software-agent-generated URLs generally have the same length, although they 
can be distinct (for example, if the URLs are encrypted).  A botmaster has to 
randomize not only the URLs, but also the URL lengths to pass this test. We use 
the standard deviation of all the observed URL lengths as the feature. 
d) Order of the request URLs 
 We take into account the predictiveness of the request URLs by calculating the 
information entropy of the order of the occurrence of the URLs. We assign to 
each URL an increasing number starting from 1 and generate a numeric sequence 
string that denotes the order of occurrence of the URLs. Then, we generate a 
signed differential number string from the sequence string that shows movement 
between consecutive URL numbers in the sequence. The following example will 
better illustrate the process: Suppose we have the numbers 1 through 9 to 
represent 9 distinct URLs. Then for an example URL sequence string 1231345231, 
the differential string will be +1+1+1-2+2+1+1-3+1-2. That is, it starts with an 
initial value of 0 and calculates the difference from the first number in the URL 
sequence string. Then, it will append the difference between the second number 
and the first number, append the difference between the third number and the 
second number, and continue appending until all the numbers are used. To 
calculate the entropy of this string, we use Shannon's formula, as given by 
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Equation (5.1), where X is a discrete random variable with possible values {x1, …, 
xn}  and H(X) is the entropy. 
                         (5.1) 
 
 
2) DNS Response Features 
The DNS response features are used to further isolate the legitimate software-
agent-targeted domains and botnet C&C domains. 
a) Number of distinct IP addresses per response 
Botmasters try to evade detection of C&C domains. Therefore, they tend to use 
IP flux and domain flux techniques. That means, the IP addresses associated with 
a domain can vary highly as well as there can be many domains for the same 
C&C server. Although the total number of distinct IP addresses associated with a 
single domain might be large, the number of IP addresses per DNS response 
packet can be lower. On the other hand, large load-balancing Web domains tend 
to have a fixed high number of IP addresses per DNS response packet. 
b) Total number of distinct IP addresses 





c) Mean TTL (Time to Live) value 
 The mean TTL value is used to check the frequency of change between IP 
addresses for a domain.  
d) Total number of distinct ASN 
Large load-balancing Web domains should have the IP addresses in a more 
concentrated distribution, whereas IP flux techniques force the botnet domain IP 
addresses to be sparsely distributed. We distinguish them by calculating the 
number of Autonomous System Numbers (ASN) for the whole IP address set. A 
legitimate Web domain should have most of the IP addresses in a single 
autonomous system, whereas a malicious domain using IP flux techniques 
should have the IP addresses distributed over many different autonomous 
systems. 
5.2.2 Feature Extraction 
We calculate the HTTP request features per source-destination IP address pair, 
where the source IP address is the client IP address and the destination IP 
address is the server IP address. We call a single source-destination IP address 
pair and the corresponding properties and features a Conversation. Since the 
features are statistical in nature, we need to have at least a minimum number of 
HTTP request packets per conversation to calculate the true value of each 
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feature. We set this minimum value to 20.  After the first stage is complete, we 
extract the primary domain name from the hostname field for each conversation 
and merge them to discard duplicates. The domain name extraction process is 
discussed in the next subsection. Then, for each domain we find all the DNS 
response packets and extract the DNS features from them. 
5.2.3 Domain Extraction 
In this work, a primary domain name refers to a domain name with all the 
subdomains after second or third level domain name stripped. For example, the 
primary domain name for my.example.com will be example.com, whereas the 
primary domain name for my.example.co.uk will be example.co.uk. This 
technique is used in both the steps in the second stage of our method, where we 
extract primary domain names from each conversation and also from each DNS 
response packet.  
5.2.4 Anomaly Detection Methods 
We have two different stages where we need to use anomaly detection. In the 
first stage for HTTP request features, we use three different anomaly detection 
methods independently in an unsupervised manner to compare between them. 
In the second stage for DNS response features, we only use the first anomaly 
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detection method based on Chebyshev's inequality in a semi-supervised manner. 
A brief overview of all three techniques is given below.  
1) Chebyshev's Inequality 
 The anomaly detection method based on Chebyshev's inequality can be used in 
both unsupervised and semi-supervised manner. This technique is particularly 
suitable when (1) the distribution of the available data is unknown or an 
experimenter does not want to make assumptions about its distribution, and (2) 
it is expected that the observations are independent from one another. The 
formula for Chebyshev's inequality is 
                   
 
  
   
Where X is a random variable, E(X) is its expected value and k > 0 is a parameter. 
This formula establishes an upper bound for the percentage of data points with 
value more than k standard deviations away from the population mean. As 
proposed by Amidan et al. [80], we use a two-stage approach to detect outliers. 
In the first stage, we use an upper bound of 0.1 (k = 3.16) to find more obvious 
outliers. Then in the second stage, after discarding the outliers from the first 
stage, we select a much smaller upper bound of 0.01 (k = 10) to fine tune the 
detection process. Following their approach, we generate the upper bound and 
lower bound for the outlier detection value (ODV) for each feature. But we 
 
103 
observe that the lower bound of the ODV values always become negative 
according to the formula. To maintain better symmetry, we include the inverse 
values of the existing features into the feature set and calculate ODV values for 
them as well. An instance is considered outlier when at least one of the feature 
values falls outside of the ODV bounds.  
2) One-class Support Vector Machine  
One-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) are a semi-supervised version of 
traditional Support Vector Machines. We use the extended version of the semi-
supervised one-class SVM such that it can be used for unsupervised anomaly 
detection as proposed by Amer et al. in [81]. Instead of implementing it from 
scratch, we use the implementation by RapidMiner Studio [82] that follows the 
same method. It generates an outlier value greater than 1 for outliers in a dataset. 
3) Nearest Neighbor based Local Outlier Factor 
This anomaly detection algorithm calculates an outlier score based on the local 
outlier factor (LOF) implementation proposed by Breunig et al. [83].Like the 
previous one, we use the implementation by RapidMiner Studio [82] for this one 
as well. Here also a normal instance has an outlier value of approximately 1, 




5.2.5 Detection Process 
Our detection method is a cumulative process on the captured packets as they 
are accumulated at a network point such as an ISP router. That means, we don't 
discard anything as completely benign and the relevant information from all the 
packets is retained. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the packets go through the steps 
into the next stages. If the packet is malicious and belongs to a C&C 
communication, it should go through all the steps and finally get detected. If the 
packet is from a benign and legitimate HTTP communication, at some point in 
the steps it will stop going to the next stage, but still the extracted information 
will be retained as part of the training set. Note that there is the possibility of 
false negative in the current round, in which the packet is malicious and belongs 
to a C&C communication, but does not get detected because of insufficient 
feature values. We want to point out that in this case the conversation along with 
its feature values is still retained for future review and not ruled out completely. 
As we capture more similar packets from the same C&C communication, it will 
eventually get picked by our detection process. This approach ensures that no 
C&C communication will be able to bypass our detection scheme completely all 
the time. The detection might be delayed but eventually the malicious 
communication will be captured. Note that the storage requirements to retain the 
conversations are significantly less since we are not storing the entire packet.   
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5.3 Experimental Evaluation 
5.3.1 Implementation 
All the processes in the flowchart of Figure 5.1 can be considered as separate 
modules in our implementation of the overall scheme. We implemented the 
feature extraction modules in Java using the jNetPcap packet parsing library [84]. 
The HTTP packet parser is already supported by jNetPcap, but we had to 
develop our own DNS packet parser on top of the existing support for packet 
parsing from jNetPcap. The domain extraction module is also part of the same 
Java code. One of the DNS features involves calculating the number of distinct 
ASN. We used the Team Cymru IP to ASN lookup [85] service for this purpose. 
For anomaly detection modules, we implemented three anomaly detection 
methods, namely, Chebyshev's inequality, one-class support vector machine, and 
nearest neighbor based local outlier factor algorithms.  






SVM Type Eta 1-class 
Kernel Type RBF 
Beta 0.3 
Epsilon 0.001 




Measure Types Mixed Measures 




 The first one is implemented from scratch by us as part of the same Java 
code we developed. The other two machine learning algorithms were 
implemented using RapidMiner Studio [82] by RapidMiner which provides 
support for many popular machine learning algorithms.  Table 5.1 lists the 
parameters used for each of the algorithm implementations. 
5.3.2 Data Collection 
The first part of our anomaly detection experiment, namely the anomaly 
detection in HTTP request traffic, is unsupervised in nature. Therefore, we 
needed a huge amount of unlabeled real world HTTP traffic for our experimental 
evaluation. We used a partial dataset from Clemson University campus network 
traffic [86] that was collected from May to June in 2013. This dataset consisted of 
general day-to-day Web browsing traffic captured for 7 days and filtered to 
remove probable malicious traffic from well-known suspicious domains. The 
total size of the dataset is 271 GB and it contained over 9 million HTTP request 
packets. The traffic was anonymized and HTTP payloads were truncated for 
privacy reasons, but we only needed the HTTP request headers. Therefore, this 
dataset was perfectly suitable for our experiment.  
 The second part of our anomaly detection, namely the anomaly detection 
in DNS response traffic, is semi-supervised in nature. That means, we needed a 
training data set of DNS response packets that will help construct the model 
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representing normal behavior. Our goal is to distinguish between large load-
sharing Web domains and botnet C&C domains. Therefore, we generated the 
normal DNS response traffic by crawling the top 500 websites in the world 
according to the Alexa ranking [87]. We crawled for 3 hours every day for a 
month to remove any kind of bias in the dataset. To reduce the size of the dataset 
we only retained the DNS traffic. The final dataset contained 97468 DNS 
response packets.  


































 To effectively evaluate our method, we needed a test dataset of known 
botnet C&C traffic. We collected binary samples (and already captured C&C 
traffic in some cases as well) for 31 HTTP based botnet families from various 
sources. Table 5.2 shows the list of botnet families. The samples were a bit old, 
but they were still useful since they were still generating the HTTP request 
packets while being executed even if the C&C servers were already down. In 
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some cases, the DNS server was responding with NXDOMAIN responses. We 
removed those packets from our experimental dataset. Therefore, the available 
test dataset was good enough for our experimental evaluation. There were in 
total 8258 HTTP request packets and 689 DNS response packets as part of the 
C&C communication in total. 
5.4 Results and Analysis  
We evaluated our method by generating the overall false negative and false 
positive ratios over the complete dataset of benign and malicious domains. After 
running our experiment, we could accurately count the number of benign and 
malicious C&C domains involved in the traffic dataset. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 list the 
results of the experiment.  
 From Table 5.3, we can see that Chebyshev's inequality performs best as 
the anomaly detection approach used in terms of false negative ratios. 
Chebyshev's inequality based approach detects almost 94% of all the malicious 
C&C domains, whereas the other two methods detect more than 80% of them. 
Even though it does not look very high in terms of detection rate, it is still very 
good considering the fact that we are detecting these small number of C&C 
domains amongst an extremely large number of legitimate domains. From Table 
5.4, we can see that the one-class SVM based approach performs best in terms of 
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false positive ratios, though all three of them have quite small percentage of false 
positives, considering the huge number of packets and corresponding domains 
are being scanned.  




Malicious (C&C) Domains 
Total Detected FN (%) 
Chebyshev's Inequality 134 125 6.71 
1-class SVM 134 111 17.16 
NN-LOF 134 101 19.40 
 





Total Detected FP (%) 
Chebyshev's Inequality 7613 338 4.43 
1-class SVM 7613 293 3.84 
NN-LOF 7613 305 4.04 
 
  
 The main reason behind the slightly larger false negative ratio is that some 
of the malicious C&C domains did not have sufficient number of communicating 
packets to get them detected. As we mentioned earlier, our method has the 
requirement of observing a minimum number of HTTP request packets to 
calculate the true feature values which will accurately represent the behavior and 
pattern that we are looking for among the participating legitimate and malicious 
hosts. After some initial tests, we found that 20 is an appropriate value for this 
minimum number and we have used it throughout our experiments. We note 
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that varying this number will result in different false negative and false positive 
ratios. Finding the optimum threshold requires an extensive evaluation process. 
We intend it to be a part of our future work.  
5.5 Related Work 
A significant amount of research work can be found related to HTTP-based 
botnet detection and botnet detection in general. However, only a small portion 
of them focus solely on detecting C&C traffic. We can roughly divide them into 
two main categories: specific HTTP-based botnet detection methods and generic 
botnet detection methods.  
 To our best knowledge, there have been only a few existing works 
focusing solely on HTTP-based botnet detection. Ashley [88] presented an 
algorithm that uses repeated HTTP connections to detect botnet C&C activity. 
The algorithm works best if the bot polls the C&C server very frequently. Brezo 
et al. [89] used several supervised machine learning algorithms to develop a 
model capable of classifying both botnet and legitimate traffic. Chen et al. [90] 
combined both Web traffic and domain analysis to detect Web-based botnets 
with fast-flux domains. Cai et al. [91] focused on HTTP-based botnet's C&C 
patterns to classify network traffic into clusters. Yamauchi et al. [92] proposed a 
detection technique for HTTP-based botnets using Support Vector Machines 
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(SVM). Venkatesh et al. [93] presented a detection method based on hidden semi-
Markov model using TCP-based SNMP MIB variables. Matthew et al. [94] 
proposed a Genetic Algorithm based layered approach to detect attacks 
conducted by HTTP botnets. Zarras et al. proposed BotHound [95] which uses 
perceivable minute differences in different implementation of the HTTP protocol 
to generate models for both malicious and benign requests and thereby classifies 
HTTP-based malware. We observe that none of the previous researchers have 
used an anomaly based approach to distinguish legitimate and malicious HTTP 
communication in order to detect HTTP-based C&C communication.  
 The field of generic botnet detection is too wide to discuss here in detail. 
Therefore, we will only briefly overview the detection techniques that are more 
relevant to our approach, namely, the anomaly or other machine learning based 
techniques. BotSniffer [96] presented anomaly based detection algorithms based 
on spatial-temporal correlation and similarity properties of botnet command and 
control activities. Appendix B of BotSniffer [96] proposed to identify HTTP C&C 
channels by detecting a repeating and regular visiting pattern from one single 
bot. BotMiner [97] used a similar approach to cluster network traffic based on 
similarity. BotHunter [98] used a real-time dialog correlation engine that 
investigates evidence of botnet life-cycle phases. Lu et al. [99] proposed to detect 
by clustering botnet traffic based on N-gram feature selection. Wurzinger et al. 
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[100] presented a system that automatically generates detection models from 
network traffic traces recorded from actual bot instances. Strayer et al. [101] 
detected botnets by examining flow characteristics such as bandwidth, duration, 
and packet timing for evidence of botnet command and control activity. Reiter et 
al. [102] proposed a method called "TAMD" which aggregates traffic flows of 
internal hosts of a network to find similar communication patterns to external 
networks. We see that all of these generic botnet detection techniques also focus 
solely on different types of C&C patterns and statistical features instead of 
legitimate communication.  
 There have been a few attempts to model the Web traffic to identify 
anomaly and thereby detect malicious traffic. Estevez-Tapiador et al. [103] used 
Markov chains to model the HTTP network traffic. Their approach detects 
attacks carried over HTTP and is not meant to detect botnet C&C traffic. Xie et al. 
[104] used a similar hidden Markov model technique based on inter-arrival time 
of HTTP requests to detect pseudo Web behavior. Their work focuses on 
modeling the user session correctly and thereby detects anomaly. Spectrogram 
[105] presented a model and sensor framework using a mixture of Markov-
chains which is able to detect Web-layer code-injection attacks. The difference 
between these works and our approach is that, ours focuses more on 
distinguishing between normal legitimate Web traffic and botnet C&C traffic, 
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rather than detecting general anomalies in the entire Web traffic. Therefore, our 
technique might fail to detect other types of attacks carried over HTTP, but will 
be able to identify botnet C&C traffic. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented an anomaly detection based detection approach for 
the HTTP-based botnet C&C communication. The main strength of our approach 
is that it is able to exploit the limitations and weaknesses of a botnet system in 
our favor to reveal its presence. We believe that this approach will be able to 
detect not only the present day known botnets but also any future unknown 
botnet with better capabilities. To verify this, we plan to extend our work to 
include real time traffic capturing and monitoring in a live network that will 
include honeypots to attract bot infection.  
 Another possible extension of our work will be to evaluate our approach 
using other anomaly detection techniques currently available varying the 





This dissertation provided some new directions towards revealing malicious 
contents hidden in the Internet. We presented an automated system for collection 
and analysis of malware hidden inside online advertisements, which can be 
detected and verified through any online multi-AV scanning services using our 
proposed multi-scanner model based optimum configurations with maximum 
accuracy. We presented a game theoretic model of the malvertising inspection 
problem that can provide guidelines for ad networks to best utilize their 
resources to mitigate the problem of malvertising. We also presented an anomaly 
detection based solution approach for the extremely difficult problem of 
detecting HTTP-based botnet command and control communication.  
 Through the proposed solutions in this dissertation, we have tackled 
important problems in four different areas of the malicious content research 
landscape. We believe that we have been successful in contributing significantly 
in furthering the progress of research in the field of network security. In future, 
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we plan to further extend our work by applying our solutions to other related 
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